शिमला। हिमाचल प्रदेश हाईकर्ट ने पूर्व आईएएस अफसर सुरेंद्रमोहन कटवाल की ओर से  सीडी कांड मे मुख्‍यमंत्री वीरभद्र सिंह और उनकी पत्‍नी पूर्व सांसद प्रतिभा सिंह को निचली अदालत से बरी करने फैसले को चुनौती देनी वाली याचिका को खारित कर दिया है।सीडी कांड में वीरभद्र सिंह को सेशन कोर्ट फारेस्‍ट ने दिसंबर 2012 में विधानसभा चुनाव के परिणाम आने से एक दिन पूर्व बरी कर दिया। एसएम कटवाल ने इस फैसले को प्रदेश हाईकोर्ट में ये कह कर चुनौती  दी थी कि प्रदेश में अब वीरभद्र सिंह की खुद की सरकार सता में आ गई है और इस मामले में उन्‍हीं के खिलाफ आरोप है। ऐसे मेंसरकार इस फैसले को हाईकोर्ट में चुनौती नहीं देगी। उन्‍होंने  ये याचिका  टाइम लिमिट समसपत होजाने केबाद दायर की थी और ज्‍यादा समय हो जाने को कंडोन  करने की अर्जी भी दी थी। प्रदेश हाईकोर्ट केजज जस्टिस धर्मचंद चौधरी ने आज कटवाल की याचिका को खारिज  कर दिया। इस पर  कटवाल ने कहा है कि वो वकीलों से राय लेकर आगमी कार्यवाही करेंगे।हाईकोर्ट की जजमेंट में कई तथ्‍यों का जिक्र है।ये सब जानने के लिए  यहा पढ़े पूरी जजमेंट-:

   High Court of H.P.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.M.P.(M) No. 11350 of 2013.

Reserved on: 22nd  April, 2015.

Decided on:  20 th  May, 2015.

 

S.M. Katwal                       … Petitioner/Appellant.

Versus

Virbhadra Singh and others                       … Respondents.

 

 

Coram

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, Judge.

 

For the  petitioner/appellant  :  Mr.  A.P.S.  Deol,  Senior

Advocate, with Mr. Virbahadur

Verma  and  Mr.  Adhiraj  Singh

Thakur, Advocates.

 

For respondents No.1  &  2  :  Mr.  R.S.  Cheema,  Senior

Advocate,  with  M/s.  Ajay

Kochhar,  Satyen  Vaidya  and

Vivek Sharma, Advocates.

 

For respondent No.3   :  Mr. R.M. Bisht and Mr. P.M.  Negi,

Deputy Advocates General.

 

 

 

Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J.

Petitioner S.M. Katwal is an IAS Officer (Retd.).

He claims himself to be  a   ‘ victim ’  within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in short to be referred as ‘the Code’, hence aggrieved by the judgment  dated  24th  December,  2012,  in  Corruption Case No.9 – S/7 of 2010,  passed  by learned Special Judge (Forests),  Shimla,  acquitting  accused- private respondents Virbhadra Singh and his wife Pritibha Singh from the charges under Sections 7, 9, 11, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under Section 120 – B of the Indian Penal Code framed  against  each  of  them .  Hence  he   has  filed  a petition  under Section 378(4) of the Code seeking leave to  appeal  along   with memorandum  of  appeal  under  Section 372 of the Code. The appeal,  however, is time b arred, therefore,  the present peti tion for condonation of delay has been filed  on the grounds, inter alia   that while  he was  at PGI, Chandigarh during the months of January -March, 2013 attending to  his ailing wife there, he  came  to  know  about  the  judgment  dated  24thDecember, 2012 under challenge in the appeal, through newspaper.   He  is  having no ac cess to the record nor engaged  any  lawyer  to  prosecute  the  case  on his behalf. On coming to know that the State of Himachal Pradesh ruled by  t he  Congress  Party  Government  and accused- respondent  No.1  the  Chief  Minister,  who  is holding  the  charge  of  Home  Department  also  and therefore,   prosecutor  and  the  accused  became  one and the same having common interest not to pursue the case  for  filing the  ap peal  against  the  judgment  of acquittal, the  petitioner has come forward to prefer an appeal  against  the  judgme nt  in  the  capacity  of  a ‘victim’ .  An  age  old  rule  “nullum  tempus  qut  locus occurrit  regi”  embedded  in  criminal  justice  delivery system has been pr essed into service and it is  submitted that  the  Parliament  while  acknowledging the said  rule has  prescribed  no  period  of  limitation  for  filing  the appeal  under  the  proviso  to  Section  372  of  the  Code against  an  order  of  acquittal.  The  rule  of  limitation,according  to  the  petitioner,  cannot  be  mechanically applied  in  a  case  of  this  nature.  He  having  obtained Photostat  copy of the judgment under challenge in the month  of  August,  2013  has  preferred  the  appeal immediately  thereafter.  It  has  been  urged  that  the delay, as occurred in filing the appeal is not intentional,but  attributed  to  the  compelling  circumstances  under which he was made to search for the relevant record required  for  the  purpose  of  drafting  the  grounds  of appeal.

2.     The  stand of the respondent- Sta te in reply to the  petition   in  a  nutshell  is  that  in  the  opinion  of  the District Attorney it was not a fit case for filing an appeal. The  said  opinion  was  examined  in  the  office  of Additional  Director  General,  State  Vigilance  &  Anti Corruption Bureau,  Himachal  Pradesh  and  the  file was forwarded  to  Additional  Secretary  (Home/Vig.).  Based upon the opinion of the District Attorney and that of Joint Director (Prosecution) in the office of Additional Director General,  State  Vigilance  &  Anti  Corruption  Bureau,Hi machal  Pradesh,  the  case  file  along  with  relevant record  was sent to the Law Department for seeking final opinion. In the office of Law Department the case being of no evidence, a conscious decision was taken for not preferring the appeal. It is pointed out that in a police challan no private individual other than victim can prefer appeal against acquittal. The petitioner allegedly is not a  victim  because  initially  it  is  the  State  Government, which  took  a  conscious  decision  to  hold  vigilance enquiry  into  the  allegations  against  accused-respondents No.1 and 2 and after submission of enquiry report a decision was taken to register a case against them.  Consequently,  FIR   No.27  of  2009   came  to  be registered  against  them  on  3rd  August,  2009  at  the instance of Supe rintendent of Police in the capacity of complainant.  Therefore,  the  petitioner  is  stated  to  be neither  complainant nor victim as defined under Section 2(wa) of the Code and as such is not entitled to prefer

an appeal under Section 372 of the Code.

3.     Private respondents in separate reply filed on their behalf have given the details of the criminal cases , which  were  registered  against  the petitioner  and  all those  cases  the  petitioner  instituted  against  the  1st respondent  and  have  submitted  that  the  petitioner  is under an impression that the criminal cases against him were registered at the instance of accused- respondent No.1 and the appeal has been filed by him with ulterior motive.  It  is  denied  that  the  petitioner  came  to  know about  the  announcement  of  judgment  of  acquittal during  the  months  of  January-March,  2013.  Rather  the judgment  dated  24th  December,  2012  was  given  wide publicity in the print as well as electronic media on 25th December, 2012. Not only this, but the statement of the petitioner as one of th e witnesses was recorded on the day  of  announcement  of  the  judgment,  i.e.,  24 th December, 2012 itself and while appearing as a witness he was fully aware about the conclusion of the trial. The appeal having been filed beyond the period of 90 days, is said to be time barred. It has also been urged that the petitioner is neither a complainant nor victim within the meaning  of  Section  2(wa)  of  the  Code,  hence  not  competent to file the appeal against their acquittal.

4.     In the counter reply (rejoinder) while deny ing the  contentions  to  the  contrary  being  wrong  and reiterating the case as set out in the  petition , it is pointed out that  accused – respondent  No.1  is  acting in mala fide manner and with ulterior motive to settle scores not only with  the  petitioner,  but  also  with  all  Officers/Officials namely,  Dr.  D.S.  Minhas,  former  Director  General  of Police,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Shri  I.D.  Bhandari,  the  then Additional Director General, Shri Daya Sagar, Inspector (Retired)  and Shri Hardesh Bisht, the then Superintendent of  Police,  Vigilance  ( now  Retired),  the    Investigating Officers,  who  supervised  the  proceedings  in  the  case reg istered  against him and his wife accused – respondent No.2 in one way or the  other/investigated the same . The instances  of  harassment  of  the  above  Police  Officers have also been highlighted in the counter reply with the help of documents, i.e., Annexure P – 3, representation of Dr.  D.S.  Minhas  to  Secretary  (Home),  Government  of India  against  the  request  made  by  the  State Government for seeking permission to charge- sheet him in  connection with the case in hand registered  against accused- respondents  No.1  and  2,  Annexure  P- 4,  a charge- sheet  served  upon  Shri  Daya  Sagar,  the  then Inspector ,  Vigilance ,  who  has  investigated  the  case partly and  Annexure  P- 5,  copy  of  FIR  No.5  dated  29th  April,  2014  registered  under  Section  218  of  the  Indian Penal  Code  against  Shri  Hardesh  Bisht,  the  then Superintendent  of  Police,  SI U  and  Shri  Daya  Sagar aforesaid  with  the  allegation  that  they  did  not investigate  the  case  against  the  accused  in  a  fair manner.

5.     It is in this backdrop, the questions that the petitioner has shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay and that he is victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa)  of  the  Code  and  entitled  to  prefer  the  appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code, have to be examined  and  answered,  however,  before  that  it  is desirable  to  take  note  of  the  facts  leading  to  the institution of the appeal along   with this petition and also the arguments addressed by learned Counsel on both si des.

6.     Accused- respondent No.1 Virbhadra Singh is the  Chief  Minister  of  Himachal  Pradesh.  Accused -respondent  No.2  Pritibha  Singh,  a  former  Member  of Parliament  is  his  wife.  Accused- respondent  No.1 remained Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh during the period 1985- 1990 also. PW- 21 Major Vijay Singh Mankotia, former  Minister  of  Himachal  Pradesh  in  the  month  of May, 2007 received a secret information at Shimla about the  audio- cassette  having  recording  of  the  voice  of accused- respondent  No.1.  The  informer  arranged  to supply the audio- cassette to PW- 21, which was found in an envelop alongwith his other Dak nearby the door of MLA flat where he was residing. He played and heard the  audio -cassette  and  found  the  same  to  be containing  the  conversation  of  accused – respondent No.1  with  Shri  Mohinder  Lal,  the  then  Deputy Commissioner, Shimla, that of accused- respondent No.2 and said Shri Mohinder Lal and also that of Shri Kedar Nath  Sharma,  the  then  OSD – cum- Private  Secretary  to  accused- respondent  No.1  and  said  Shri  Mohinder  Lal qua the exchange of money in lacs of rupees between  the  accused – respondents  on  one  side  and  Mr. Piyush Jain  of Mini – Steel Plant, Mr.  Suresh Neotia and Mr. P.C. Jain  of M/s.  Gujarat  Ambuja  Cement,  Brigadier  Kapil Mohan, owner of Mohan Meakin  through on e Mr. Suresh Kapoor of Mohan Meakin Brewery and one Mr. Mittal of Kangra on the other.

7.     PW- 21  has  convened  the  press  conference on 28th  May, 2007. The audio -cassette was played in that  conference  in  the  presence  of  media  persons  and released  to  the  media.   The  audio – cassette  was  given wide  publicity  in  the  media.  Petitioner  S.M.  Katwal  (PW – 37) having gone through the news – item in the issues of Hindi dailies “Dainik Bhaskar” and “Divya Himachal” dated 29th May, 2007, has reported the matter to Station House   Officer,  Police  Station,  Vigilance  and  Anti Corruption,  Shimla  vide petition   dated  30th  May,  2007 (Ext.PW – 37- A). The contents of the same  read as follows :

“Your  attention  is  invited  towards  the  news published in the Hindi  Dailies,  Dainik  Bhaskar  and Divya  Himachal of 29-5- 2007 containing  details of telephonic  conversation  between  a  high  officer and reportedly the present CM and his wife and mentioning others, about payment/acceptance of huge  sums  of  money.  The  facts,  prima  facie disclose commission of off ences, under the PC Act and  Specific  Corrupt  Practices  Act,  IPC (Conspiracy) and other laws. I request that a case against the persons named/mentioned therein be registered and action as per law be taken against the  persons, and  a  copy  of  the  FIR so  regist ered may be supplied to me, as per law. It is no excuse that the case is old or that I have no locus standi. There  is  no  time  limit  in  such  like  cases  and  any body can set the law in motion.

Earlier also, I had requested that a case be registered about jobs on chits, and when no action was taken I  had to pray to the Hon’ble High Court and as per directions of the Hon’ble Court, a case (FIR No.1/2006) was registered. It is another matter that under pressure and deliberately, no accused was named and efforts have been and are being made to dilute the offences and the cases, about which  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  in  a  recently reported case has taken a serious view. Non action or  non  response  will  mean  that  you  are  also committing  an  offence  under  sections  120 B,  217, 218 of the IPC and I may have to approach the Hon’ble  High  Court  again  impleading  your  as  a party.”

 

8.   On  receipt  of  the  complaint   (Ext.PW37 – A) supra, the Vigilance Headquarter forwarded the same to the  Secretary – cum- Director  Vigilance,  Government  of  Himachal  Pradesh  vide  letter  No.Vig- Compl.199/2007 (SML) – 8687/Confidential  dated  7th  June,  2007  for issuance of necessary directions in the matter. Since the complaint was against former Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh and his wife having reference of CD released by PW- 21,  the  Government  decided  to  get  the  matter enquired  into  from  the  Vigilance  Department.  The Vigilance  Headquarters  was  directed  to  take appropriate action in the matter and submit the report to the Government. One CD and copy of CWP No. 1913 of  2007  (Ext.PW -37/B) filed by  S.M.  Katwal  (PW- 37)  was also forwarded to Vigilance Headquarters.

9.   Consequently,  the  Vigilance  Headquarters entrusted  the  enquiry  to  Shri  Anand  Pratap  Singh, Superintendent  of  Police,  State  Vigilance  and  Anti Corruption  Bureau,  Southern  Zone,   Shimla,  vide  letter dated  18th   February,  2008.    Shri  Anand  Pratap  Singh aforesaid sought for the service record of Shri Mohinder Lal from General Administration Department of Himachal Pradesh and also sought the voice samples of accu sed -respondents  No.1  and  2  from  the director,  Public Relations  Department,  Himachal  Pradesh.  The  record and voice samples  so sought  were received. It is on 2nd May, 2008 the Inquiry Officer recorded the statement of Shri Mohinder Lal in the presence of Shr i I.D. Bhandari, the then Additional Director General of Police and Shri Ashok Tiwari, Deputy Inspector General, which reads as follows:

“I  have  heard  the  CD  today  purported  to have been converted from a tape recorded  sometime in the year 1989. At that tim e there was  no  CD  but  only  Tape  Recorders  were available.  I  do  not  know  as  to  how  and where it has been recorded. The contents of the CD contain prima facie my conversation with the then Chief Minister, his wife and Shri K.N. Sharma etc. Prima facie the vo ice in the CD  is  mine  and  as  far  as  I  remember  the conversation has taken place. As regards the names of the persons and the detail thereof the  same  must  have  recorded  by  Rani Sahiba and may be obtained from her. The persons, who made contributions as far as I remember, were sent to the Chief Minister’s house on various occasions and the present CD  is  a  version  of  those occasions  which happened  and  appears  to  have  been recorded  on  various  dates  and  made  into one tape/CD. I am available for any further clarification  based  on  my  memory  at  any time  as  and  when  needed,  as  the  matter relates to long time back.”

 

10.  The  samples  of  voice  of  the  accused -respondents  supplied  by  the  office  of  Director,  Public Relations,  Himachal  Pradesh  were  sent  to  Forensic Science  Laboratory,  Chandigarh  for  comparison  and report. The Forensic Science Laboratory has submitted its opinion, which reads as follows:

“Hence, the voice samples marked ‘Exh- Q1 and Exh – S1’ are probable voice of the same person (Smt. Praibha Singh)”. “Hence,  the  voice  samples  of  speakers marked ‘Exh- Q2 and Exh- S2’ are voice of the same  person  (Sh.  Virbhadra  Singh,  Former Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh) with high probability.”

11.  The  record  pertaining  to  allotment  of  steel plant  to  one Piyush  Jain   was  requisitioned  from  the Managing  Director,  HPSIDC,  Shimla.  The  same  was received  and  Shri  Ashok  Tiwari,  Deputy  Inspector General  (Vigilance),  has  examined  the  same  on  the directions  of  the  then  Additional  Director  General Vigilance  and  submitted  the  report  on  14th  May ,  2008 highlighting therein that the Committee had helped Shri Piyush Jain in the matter of allotment of the steel plant. The  exchange  of  money  between  R.R.,  who  in  the opinion  of  the  Inquiry  Officer  could  have  been  Shri Rangila  Ram  Rao,  the  then  Industry  Minister- cum-Chairman  of  Board  of  Directors  and  Piyush  Jain  also surfaced, as per the conversation recorded in the CD.

12.  Shri Santosh Patial, Superintendent of Police, Sate  Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption  Bureau,  Northern Range, Dharamshala, was directed to interrogate Major Vijay  Singh  Mankotia  (PW21)  in  the  matter.  The audio-cassette  was  taken  into  possession  by  Shri  Paras  Ram, Dy.S.P.  (Vigilance)  on  21st   May,  2008  from  Major  Vijay Singh Mankotia.

13.  After  conducting  the  enquiry,  the  Inquiry Officer Shri Anand  Pratap Singh has submitted the report dated 18th  August, 2008 to the Vigilance Headquarters,which reads as follows:

“To  the  Addl.  Director  General  of  Police SV&ACB,  Shimla  dated  Shimla- 2,  the  18th  August, 2009.  Subject: –   Complaint  against  former  Chief Minister and his wife made by Shri S.M. Katwal IAS (Retd.)  on  the  basis  of  CD  released  by  Sh. Mankotia.  Sir,  A  complaint  dated  16- 2- 08 (No.Home (Vig) A(5) 147/2007 MLA) was received from  Principal  Secretary,  Home  and  Vigilance  to enquire into the C.D. relea sed by Mr.  Vijay Singh Mankotia  and  CWP  1913/07  filed  by  Sh.  S.M. Katwal,  IAS  (Retd.)  in  Hon’ble  High  Court  in  this regard. 2. During enquiry, a transcript of the C.D. was made and statement of Sh. Mohindra Lal IAS (Retd.) was recorded on 02- 05- 08. The statement of Sh. S.M. Katwal IAS (Retd.) was recorded on 07- 05-08.  On  15- 05- 08  the  statements  of  Sh.  Chaman  Kapoor,  Sh. Rajinv Bhanot and Smt.  Santosh Saini were  also  recorded  at  Una.  3.  On  08-05- 08,  the C.D. submitted by Sh. S.M. Katwal IAS (Retd.) was sent  for  Auditory  Analysis  to  Central  Forensic Laboratory,  Chandigarh,  alongwith  a  Video  C.D. which  contained  voice  samples  of  both  Sh. Virbhadra  Singh  and  Smt.  Praibha  Singh,  and  a Digital Video Cassette, which contained the voice samples of Smt. Pratibha Singh. Both the Video C.D. and the Digital Video cassette were obtained from the Director Public Relation H.P.  4.   On 21- 05- 08 Sh. Vijay Singh Mankotia also handed over an audio cassette to the Vigilance team handed by Dy.S.P SV&ACB  Dharamshala  purporting  to  c ontain  the voices  of  Sh.Virbhadra  Singh,  Smt.  Pritabha  Singh and Sh. Mohinder Lal, IAS (Retd.). This cassette was sent  to  Central  Forensic  Science  Laboratory,Chandigarh ,  on  23- 05- 08.  5.  According  to  Sh. Mohinder  Lal,  the  voices  belong  to  him,  Sh. Virbhadra Singh, Smt. Pratibha Singh and Sh. K.N. Sharma (now deceased). He has also stated that “the persons,  who made contributions  as far as I remember, were sent to the Chief Minister’s House on  various  occasions  and  the  present  CD  is  a version  of  those occasi ons whi ch happened and appears to have been recorded on various dates and made into one tape/CD”. He was evasive and did  not  comment  on  ‘how’  and  ‘where’  it  was recorded.  6.  Sh.  S.M.  Katwal  IAS  (Retd.)  in  this statement has also stated that since he was po sted as SDM Rampur in the past and had worked with Sh.  Virbhadra Singh in various capacities, he was familiar  with  his  voice  and  was  certain  that  the voice in the C.D. was that of Sh.  Virbhadra Singh . He  was  also  familiar  with  the  voices  of  Smt. Pratibha  Singh  and  Sh.  Mohinder  Lal,  IAS  (Retd.) and  was  certain  that  the  CD  in  question  also contained their voices. 7. Shri Chaman Kapoor, Sh. Rajiv  Bhanot  and  Smt.  Santosh  Saini,  whose statements  were  also  recorded  at  Una  have claimed to identify the voices in th e CD as those of Sh.  Virbhadra  Singh,  Smt.  Pratibha  Singh  and  Sh. Mohinder Lal IAS (Retd.). 8. The report from Central Forensic  Science  Laboratory,  Directorate  of Forensic  Science  No.CFSL/301/08/Phy/62/08 – 484 dated  8/8/08),  copy  attached,  opines  as  under:

“The auditory analysis of recorded speech samples of  speakers  marked  ‘Exh- Q1  and  Exh- S1’  and subsequent  acoust ic  analysis  of  the  recorded speech   samples  of  the  speakers  marked  Exh – Q1 and  Exh- S1  by  using  Computerized  Speech  Lab (CSL),  revealed  that  voice  e xhibits  of  speakers marked ‘Exh- Q1’ are similar to the voice exhibits of speaker  marked  ‘Exh – S1’  in  respect  of  their acoustic  cues  and  other  linguistic  and  phonetic features.    Hence  the  voice  samples  of  speakers marked ‘Exh- Q1’ and ‘Exh- S1’ are probable voice of  the  same  person  (Smt.  Pratibha  Singh)”.    “The auditory  analysis  of  recorded  speech  samples  of speakers marked ‘Exh – Q2’ and ‘Exh- S2’ and ‘Exh-S2’  and  subsequent  acoustic  analysis  of  the recorded speech samples of the speakers marked ‘Exh – Q2’  and  ‘Exh- S2’  by  using  Computerized Speech Lab (CSL), revealed that voice exhibits of speakers marked ‘Exh – Q2’ are similar to the voice exhibits of speakers marked ‘Exh- S2’ in respect of their  acoustic  cues  and  other  linguistic  and phonetic  features.    Hence  the  voi ce  samples  of speakers marked ‘Exh – Q2’ and Exh- S2’ are voice of the same person (Sh. Virbhadra Singh, Former Chief Minister  of  Himachal  Pradesh)  with  high probability”.  9.  A  study  of  the  transcripts  and contents  of  the  C.D.  r eveals  a  total  of  nine  conversations by  Sh.  Mohinder  Lal,  four  with  Smt. Pratibha Singh,  four with Sh.  Virbhadra Singh and one  with  K.N.  Sharma.    During  the  course  of  the conversation the following points comes  to notice:

1) The conversations took place immediately prior to  the  Lok  Sabha  Elections  of  February,  1990,  as there is discussion regarding 4 seats of Lok Sabha from  Himachal  Pradesh,  and  since  Shri  Mohinder Lal is of the opinion that these conversations took place in 1989, it may be reasonably inferred that the  conversations  took  place  during  the  last months of 1989 and may have gone into the early months of 1990 before the Vidhan Sabha elections.

2) The following persons appea red to have made contributions’:1) Atma  Ram  2.)  Owner of Ambuja Cement 3.) Mr. Jain (In connection with a  hotel in Manali 4.) Mr. Kapur of Mohan Meakins 5) Owner of Kangra Flour Mills 6.) One Mr. Mittal from Kangra 7.) Some  person  from  Gujarat  8.)  Some  person  from K&K  9.)  One  Mr.  Neotia.  10.)  Mr.  Piyush  Jain  (in connection with the allotment of a steel plaint) 3. There is also a reference of helping “these people as  and  when  the  opportunity  arises”  4.)  There  is mention  of  collection  of  more  than  25  lacs  as against the target of 1 5 lacs. 10. During enquiry the following facts also came to light: 1. A project wa s awarded to Gujarat ambuja Cement Ltd.  for the manufacture  of  all  types  of  cements  for  Rs.  150 crores on 19.2.90, and that this project was under consideration during the period when conversation took  place.    2.  A  mini  steel  plant  project  of  Mr. Piyush  Ja in  (Sl  No.  10)  was  under  consideration during the period when conversation took place.

3.   A case  of  Hotel  Honeymoon Inn  (then  called Hotel  Hill  Huts)  was  also  pending  with  the government during the period when conversation took  place.    An  FIR  for  illegal  purchase  was  also registered against Sh.  Satish Chand Jain  (Sl No.3) along  with  revenue  employees,  in  the  Vigilance department in 1989 and was under investigation at the time of these conversations.  The case was not charge  sheeted  subsequently  because  Mr.  Satish Chand Jain passed away.  A departmental inquiry against  revenue  officials  was  ordered.    The  land was eventually transferred to Hotel Hill Huts by the order  of  Financial  Commissioner-cum- Secretary (Rev)  vide  order  No.Rev  2  F(10)38/88  dated 10/9/1992.    4.  Shri  Mohinder  Lal’s  case  for promotion  into  the  super  time  Scale  was  also pending for which DPC was to take place at the time  of  these  conversations  and  there  are references  to  it.    11.  The  contents  of  the  C.D. Suggest that Sh. Mohinder Lal I.A.S. (Retd.), posted as  Director  of  Industries,  was  a  conduit  for arranging delivery of money to Sh. Virbhadra Singh through various industrialists.  It is quite obvious that a record was maintained of the amount collected.  There  is  also  a  reference  of  an  amoun t  having being  paid  by  Sh.  Piyush  Jain  ‘Rao  Sahab’  on allotment  of  the  Steel  Mill.    12.    Since  the  voice samples have been matched by CFSL the identity of the speakers is clear.  Furthermore, Sh. Mohinder Lal,  IAS  (Retd.)  in  his  statement  identifies  these voices  as  his  own  and  as  those  of  Sh.  Virbhadra Singh and Smt. Pratibha Singh.  It is also pertinent to mention  here  that  no  clues  recording  where  or how or by whom the C.D was made, came to light during inquiry, as the matter in question pertains to 1989.    Shri  S.M.  Katwal  IAS  (Retd.)  only  mentions that the C.D was found in his letter box during the time of Lok Sabha Elections.  Shri Mohinder Lal, IAS (Retd.) and Sh. Vijay Singh Mankotia has also not provided any information in this regard.  13. During the   course  of  enquiry  evidence  of  allotment  of Ambuja Cement  and  Steel Mill to  Sh. Piyush  Jain and case of Hotel Honeymoon Inn on behalf of Sh. Sathish Chand Jain also came to light. It cannot be established where any favours were indeed given to any of the c ontributors mentioned above in the letter. But  it is quite clear that these matters were pending with the Government towards the end of 1989.  14. Sec. 13 1(d) (ii) and (d) (iii) of the PC act 1988  define  Criminal  Misconduct  as  under:  13. Criminal Misconduct by Public Servant (1) A Public servant is  said  to  commit  the  offenc e  of  criminal misconduct, (d) if he, — (ii) by abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person  any  valuable  thing  or  pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or  pecuniary  advantage,  without  any  public interest.  The inquiry is complete and the fa cts that have come to light have been disused above.  The entire  record  collected  during  the  course  of enquiry  is  in  the  custody  of  the  undersigned.  Hence the report is submitted as desired by your letter  No.  Vig.  Compl – 199/2007(SML) – 2418  dated 18/2/2008.”

Thanking You ,

Yours faithfully, Sd/ –

A.P.

Singh, SP SV&ACB SR Shimla.”

 

14.  The  Additional  Director  General  of  Police State  Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption  Bureau,  Himachal Pradesh has forwarded the report to Principal Secretary (Home)  and  Vigilance  vide  letter  No.16345  dated  9th September,  2008,  with  his  opinion  that  prima  facie  a cognizable of fence  is  found to have been committed by the accused-respondents and that it is the Government, which is the competent authority to take final decision in this regard.

15.  The  matter  was  examined  in  the  Home Department and vide letter No.Home(Vig.)A(5)147/2007  (MLA&MP) Govt. of HP Department of Home (E – Section) dated  31st  July,  2009,  the  Vigilance  Headquarter   was informed as under:

“As per opinion of the Law Department, the Police  Officer  has  to  take  an  independent decision after due application of mind. You ar e  therefore,  requested  to  take  further necessary action in the matter. Enquiry report as  received  from  your  office  is  returned herewith.”

16.  The above communication was receiv ed in the  Vigilance Headquarter   on  1st August,  2009  and  on the  receipt  thereof ,  Dir ector  General  of  Police,  State Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption  Bureau,  Shimla,  has ordered as under:

“Get  the  case  registered  in  P.S.  SV&ACB, Shimla and let it be investigated by S.P. (SIU) SV&ACB, Shimla.”

17.  It  is  how  the  case  vide  FIR  No.27  of  2009 came to be registered against the accused – respondents by  Shri  Arvind  Digvijay  Singh  Negi,  the  then  Additional Superintendent of Police, Incharge, Police Station, State Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption  Bureau,  Shimla,  under Sections 8, 9, 10, 13(1)   (d)(i)(ii) read wit h Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120 -B of the Indian  Penal Code.

18.  The  investigation  was  entrusted  to  Special Investigating  Unit  vide  letter  No.Reader/SR/09- 5045 dated  3rd  August,  2009.  The  Investigating  Officer  had obtained the notifications qua  appointment of  accused-respondent No.1 as Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh. The  transcript  of  CD  in  nine  separate  parts  was  got prepared and each and every part carefully analyzed. It transpired  that  Super  Time  Scale  was  due  to  Shri Mohinder  Lal  on  1st  January,  1990;   however,  the  same was released to him well before the due date on 23rd November,  1989.  The  required  action  in  the  matter including constitution of the Committee for the purpose was taken on the same day, i.e., 23rd   November, 1989 itself. In the opinion of the investigating agency it wasdone to help Shri Mohinder Lal, who was apprehending the  defeat  of  the  Congress  Party  in  1989  General Election  of  Lok  Sabha  followed  by  the  election  of  HP Legislative  Assembly  in  the  month  of  February,  1990, hence was in hurry in the matter of his induction in super time scale on promotion. Shri Mohinder Lal died on 19th January, 2009 during the investigation of the case and in his place his son Kavinder Lal (PW – 22) was associated in t he investigation of the case.

19.  The  permission  to  set- up  cement  plant  by Gujarat  Ambuja  Cement  was  also  found  to  be expedited in haste allegedly on receipt of bribe. In the matter of installation of modified Effluent Treatment Plant by  Mohan  Meakin,  no  action  was  taken  by  the concerned Department and it so happened on account of  accused – respondent  No.2  received  ` 2  lacs  from  its owner. The  case to grant permissi on to set- up mini steel plant by one  Piyush Jain was also found to be given with a view to help him in lieu of the money received from him by the accused- respondents and also Shri Rangila Ram  Rao, the then Industry Minister; however, no case could be registered against Mr. Rao for want of sufficient evidence.

20.  The perusal of the transcript of the CD further reveals that lacs of rupees were taken in bribe by the accused- respondents in connivance with Shri Mohinder Lal.  Though  involvement  of  Shri  Mohinder  Lal  was  also established,  however,  as  he  died  during  the  course  of investigation,  therefore,  no  challa n  could  be  filed against him.

21.  In view of the investigation conducted in the matter,  the  investigating  agency  has  arrived  at  a conclusion  that  accused -respondent  No.1  has committed  the  offence  punishable  under  Sections  10, 13(1)(d),(i), (ii) read with Secti on 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and 120- B of the Indian Penal Code, whereas accused- respondent No.2 under Sections 8 and 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and 120- B of the Indian Penal Code.

22.  The report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  was  filed  accordingly  against  both accused- respondents  in  the  Court  of  learned  Special Judge  (forests),  Shimla.  This  has  led  to   registration  of Corruption Case No.9- S/7 of 2010 against them.

23.  Learned  Special  Judge  after  taking  into consideration  the  police  report  and  the  documents annexed  therewith  and  hearing  learned  Public Prosecutor as well as defence Counsel, has prima facie found  a  case  under  Sections  7,  13(1)(d)  read  with Section 13(2), 11 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sectio n  120- B  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  made  out against  accused- respondent  No.1,  whereas  under Section  9  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  and Section  120-B  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  against accused- respondent  No.2.  Charges  against  both  of them were framed acco rdingly to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

24.  After holding full trial, learned Special Judge has  arrived  at  a  conclusion  that the  prosecution  has failed  to  prove  its  case  against  accused – respondents beyond  reasonable  doubt  and  vide  judgment  dated 24th December, 2012 they have been acquitted from the charges framed against each of them.

25.  As noticed at the very outset , the State has not  preferred  any  appeal  against  the  judgment  of acquittal. It is the petitioner, who claims himself to be the complainant and ultimately a victim within the meaning of  Section  2  (wa)  of  the  Code,  has  filed  the  appeal under the proviso to  Section  372 along   with  a  petition under  Section  378  (4)  of  the  Code  seeking leave  to appeal.  Since  the  appeal  is  barred  by  96  days,  the present  petition  has been filed with a prayer to condone the delay so occurred in filing the same.

26.  Mr.  A.P.S.  Deol,  learned  Senior  Advocate assisted  by  M/s.  Virbahadur  Verma  and  Adhiraj  Singh Thakur, Advocate s,  has made many fold submissions to substantiate   the  question  of  maintainability  of  the appeal,  the  petitioner  a  victim  within  the  meaning  of Section 2(wa) of the Code and  to persuade this Court that  the  appeal  on  condonation  of  delay  may  be entertained.

27.  As  the respondent- State  and  also  accused-p rivate respondents have raised the question of locus -standi of the petitioner to file the appeal and that he has not  suffered  any  loss  or  injury  including  physical  or mental, economic loss or impairment of his fundamental right through acts and omissions f or which the accused persons were charged, hence not a ‘victim’ within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code . The petitioner, however,  claims  himself  to  be  a  ‘victim’,  hence,  it  is urged that  the proviso to Section 372 extends a right in his  favour  to  file  the  appeal.  Besides,  while  raising  the question  of  fairness  of  the  trial  and  learned  Special Judge allegedly ignored  the  merits,  it is  urged   that  on condonation of delay as occurred in filing the appeal, the same be decided on merits.

28.  Therefore,  the  fo llowing  points   arise  for consideration of this Court:

(1 )  Whether the petitioner is a ‘victim’ within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code and he has locu s- standi to file an appeal  under the  proviso  to  Section  372  of  the  Code against the judgment of acquit tal passed by learned  Special  Judge  (Forests),  Shimla  on 24th December, 2012?

(2 )  Whether  the  petitioner  has  been  able  to show  sufficient cause to condone the delay, as occurred in filing the appeal?

(3 )  Whether  the  merit  of  the  case  has  been  ignored by the trial Court?

(4 )  Whether  fair  trial  has  not  been  conducted by the trial Court?

 

Point No.1.

Brief b ackground:

29.  There is no quarrel that proviso to Section 372 of  the  Code  incorporated  by  way  of  amendment  on and  with  effect  from  31st  December,  2009,  extends  a right  in favour of a victim to prefer an appeal against the judgment passed by the Court acquitting the accused or  convicting  for  a  lesser  sentence  or  imposing inadequate compensation either to the Sessions Court or to the High Court, as the case may be.  In Cr.M .No.790 -MA of 2010(O&M), titled M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. v.  M/s. Atma Tube Products Ltd. and others   along with its connected matter  Cr.M.A.  No.547- MA  of  2011(O&M),  titled  Kesar Singh  v.  Dheeraj Kumar, Punjab and Haryana High Court though has held that in  an ap peal filed under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code , the leave to appeal under Section 378 of the Code is not required to be obtained  in a   case  of  private  complaint  and  the  victim  is  a complainant. He has got two options, i.e. either to file appeal against the order of acquittal recorded by the trial  Court  to  the  High  Court  under  Section  378   of  the Code or to the Sessions Court, as the case may be under the  proviso  to  Section  372  of  the  Code.    The  present, however,  is  a  case  where  the  proceedings  against accused- respondents  No.1 and 2  have been launched consequent upon registration of a criminal case against both of them.  In a case of this nature, as per Division Bench of our own High Court in Joginder Singh v.  State of Himachal  Pradesh,  2013(2)  RCR  (Cr iminal)  60 , leave to appeal is required to be obtained by the victim for filing an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code.

30.  Any  how  the  main  dispute  herein is  as  to whether the petitioner is a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the  Code and has locus- standi to file the appeal or not.

31.  The  urge  to  find  out  true  answers  to  the questions  so  formulated  vis- à -vis  the  law  laid  down  by the  Apex  Court  and  various  High  Courts  by  way  of judicial  pronouncements  led  to  lengthy  arguments addressed on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. A.P.S. Deol, learned  Senior  Advocate  assisted  by  bright  young lawyers  S/Shri   Virbahadur  Verma  and  Adhiraj  Singh Thakur, Advocates, whereas the private respondents  by Mr. R.S. Cheema, learned Senior Advocate  a ssisted by S/Shri  Ajay Kochhar, Satyen Vaidya and Vivek Sharma , Advocates  and  respondent  No.3 – State  by  S/Shri  R.M. Bisht and P.M. Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General.     Respective  contentions  of  learned  Counsel   representing the parties.

 

32.  Though it is Mr. Cheema,  who has raised the question  of  maintainability  of  the  petition   for condonation of delay and also leave to appeal as well a s the appeal filed therewith, this Court  allowed Mr. Deol to address arguments first in counter to the question so raised.

33.  Mr. Deol h as drawn the attention of the Court to  the  definition  of  the  ‘victim’  as  defined  in  Section 2(wa) of the Code, the same reads as follows:

“Victim  means  a  person  who  has  suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been  charged  and  the  expression  “victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir.”

34.  The ‘victim’, therefore, is a person, who has suffered  any  loss  or  injury  on  account  of  an  act  or omission  with  which  the  accused  persons  have  been charged.  The emphasis,  therefore,  is  on  terms  “loss” or “injury”. The  term  “loss”  has  not  been  defined   in  the Code.   However,  it  is  Section  23  of  the  Indian  Penal Code, which de fine s  term “wrongful loss”  as follows:

“ “Wrongful  loss” .-   “Wrongful  loss”  is  the  loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled.”

35.  The term “injury” is also defined in Section 44 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as follows:

“44. “Injury”. –  The word “injury” denotes any harm  whatever  illegally  caused  to  any person,  in  body,  mind,  reputation  or property.”

36.  According  to  Mr.  Deol,  Ext.PW- 37/A  is  the complaint , which has been made by the petitioner and thereby  set  into  motion  the  machinery.  He  is  a  public spirited  person  and  as  the  acquittal  of  the  accused persons has resulted in “loss” or “injury” to him, therefore, he is a ‘victim’ and as such entitled to file the appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code.

37.  In  support  of  his  contentions ,  he  placed reliance  on  the  decision  of  Full  Bench  judg ment  of Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Tata Steel’s case supra.  In  this  judgment  terms  “victim”,  “wrongful  loss” and “injury” have been discussed in detail and liberally construed.

38.  Mr.  Deol  has  also  placed  reliance  upon  a decision of the Apex Court in  Sheo Nandan Paswan    v. State of Bihar and others,  AIR 1987 SC 877.

39.  Another  precedent  relied  upon  is  the judgment of Bombay High Court in  Balasaheb RangnathKhade v.  State of Maharashtra and others, 2012 (2) CCR 381 .  It is the observations in paras 47 a nd 48 of this report which have been pressed into service.

40.  Mr.  Deol  has  also placed  reliance  on  a  Division Bench judgment of this Court in  Joginder Singh’s case  supra. In this judgment also it is held that a victim has  a  right  to  file  an  appeal  against  a judgment  of acquittal of the accused and also conviction for lesser offence  as  well  as  inadequacy  of  compensation   on obtaining leave to appeal under Section 378 (4) of the Code.

41.  Mr.  Deol  has  also  placed  reliance  on  a Division  Bench  judgment  of  Gauhati  High   Court  (Agartala Bench) in C.M. Appl (Crl) 89 of 2011 in Crl. A. No.13 of 2011, titled  Gouranga Debnath v.  State of Tripura and  others  and  on  that  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  High Court in Ram  Kaur  @  Jasw inder  Kaur  v .  Jag bir  Singh  @ Jabi and others (2010) 3 RCR (Cri.), 391 (DB) .

42.  A  Full  Bench  of  Gujarat  High  Court  in Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana  v.  State of Gujarat and others,  2013  Cri.L.J.  4225  has  also  held  that  the  victim can file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code to  challenge therein the order of acquittal or conviction  for  lesser  offence  or  award  of  inadequate  compensation, irrespective of the State has also filed an appeal against the same order.

43.  Mr. R.S.  Cheema,  learned Senior Advocate, while repelling the arguments addressed by Mr. Deol on the question of maintainability of the delay   petition , the peti tion   for  leave  to  appeal  and  the  appeal,  has strenuously  contended  that  the  petitioner  is  n either  a complainant nor even an informant and rather a whistle blower, as the FIR  against the acc used- respondents  was

registered  on  the  basis  of  the  complaint  made  by Superintendent  of  Police,  State  Vigilance  and  Anti Corruption Bureau, Shimla.  The petitioner’s claim that he being  a  public  spirited  person  and  as  such  is  a complainant/first  informant  is  not  sustainable.  The proceedings  have  been  initiated  by  the  petitioner merely  to  wre ak-vengeance  against  the  private respondents  as  he  is  under  the  impression  that  the criminal cases have been registered against him at their instance.  T herefore,  according  to  Mr.  Cheema,  the petitioner is inimical towards accused – respondents No.1 and 2. He according to Mr. Cheema, at the most is a whistle- blower. A whistle- blower cannot be termed to be a ‘victim’. It is also urged that even if the petitioner is to be  trea ted  as  an  informant  or  a  complainant  in  that event also he has no right to prefer an appeal as the proviso to Section 372 of the Code extends a right only in favour of a victim and not in favour of the complainant/  first informant . From the case law referred to by Mr. Deol, it is pointed out that there is not even a single decision in which  a  view  that  complainant  has  a  right  to  file  an appeal  in  terms  of  Section  372  of  the  Code,  is  taken.

According  to  Mr.  Cheema,  in  M/s.  Tata  Steel’s  case supra, the point in issue was  qua  the definition of victim, whereas  in Balasaheb  Rangnath  Khade’s  case  the question  examined  and  answered  was  with  regard  to the  requirement  of  obtaining  leave  to  appeal  by  the victim to file an appeal under  the proviso to  Section 372 of the  Code. The judgment rendered by Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in  Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana’s  case  deals  only  with  the  right  of  a  victim  to  file  an appeal  and  stated  to  be  not  relevant  to  the  present controversy. The ratio of the law laid down by the  H igh Court  of  Gauhati  (Agartala  Bench)  in  Gouranga Debnath’ s  case  deals  only   with  the  question  that  the father  of  a  person  murdered,  is  victim  or  not  whereas that of the Apex Court in Sheo N andan Paswan’s  case deals with the question of a non-informant to challenge an order of withdrawal of prosecution by the Prosecutor.

44.  Per contra, Mr. Cheema has placed reliance on  the  judgment  of  the  Apex  Court  in  National Commission  for  Women   v.  State  of  Delhi  and  another, (2010)  12  SCC  599.   It  is  held  in  this  judgment  th at  the impression ‘victim’ has to be interpreted in appropriate legal  perspective.  It  was  a  case  of  atrocities  against woman  and  the  Apex  Court  has  held  that  National Commission  for  Women  was  neither  victim  nor complainant to file the appeal. This judgment reads as follows:

“11.  An  appeal  is  a  creature  of  a  Statute  and cannot lie under any inherent power.    This Courtdoes  undoubtedly  grant  leave  to  the  appeal under  the  discretionary  power  conferred  under Article  136  of  the  Constitution  of  India  at  the beh est  of  the  State  or  an  affected  private individual  but  to  permit  anybody  or  an organization pro- bono publico to file an appeal would  be  a  dangerous  doctrine  and  would cause  utter  confusion  in  the  criminal  justice system. We are, therefore, of the opinion t hat the Special  Leave  Petition  itself  was  not maintainable.”

45.  Reliance  has  also  been  placed  upon  a Division  Bench  judgment  of  Punjab  and  Haryana  High Court in CRM No.26221 of 2011 and CRM No.A- 402 – MA of 2011, titled  Parmod Kumar v.  Har Parkash and others,  in which  petitioner  Parmod  Kumar,  who  had  lodged  the FIR, was not held to be a victim.

Discussion and the conclusion drawn:

46.  Now analyzing the rival submissions and also the law cited at the bar, proviso to Section 372 of the Code  extends  an  indefeasible  r ight  to  the  victim  to prefer an appeal against an order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or  imposing  inadequate   compensation.  There  is  no quarrel in this regard. The petitioner is a victim or not, is a question hotly contested on both sides.

47.  It  is  well  established  from  the  law  cited  on both sides that it is not necessary that an informant or the complainant  is  always  a  victim  and  proviso  to Section 372 of the Code confers a right upon the victim  alone to prefer  an  appeal  and  not  on  an  informant  or  a complainant. The appeal is a creation of statute and the right  to  file  an  appeal  has  to  be  determined  with reference to the relevant statutory provisions.

48.  In  a  case  of  prosecution  launched  on  the registration  of  FIR  a nd  presentation  of  police  report under Section 173 of the Code, it is only the State, which is competent to prefer the appeal and the statute does not confer power on a complainant or informant, who is not a victim , to prefer an appeal against the acquittal.

49.  Adverting to the case in hand, of course, on the  complaint Ext.PW – 37/A made by the petitioner ,  he set into motion the machinery because it is consequent upon  said  complaint  the  Government  ordered  an enquiry  into  allegations  in  the  complaint,  which  was conducted by Shri Anand Pratap Singh, Superintendent of Police, State Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau. He submitted  the  report  and  it  is  on  the  basis  thereof  FIR No.27 of 2009 under Sections 8, 9, 10, 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) read with Section 13(2)  of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120 – B of the Indian Penal Code was registered against accused – respondents No.1 and 2.

50.  As per the decisions cited at the bar and the law  as  discussed  hereinabove,  laid  down  therein,  the proviso to Section 372 of the Code empowers the victim to  prefer  an  appeal  against  an  order  acquitting  the accused  or  convicting  for  lesser  sentence  or  imposing inadequate compensation. None of the precedents so cited except for M/s. Tata Steel Limited and  Gouranga DebNath’s cases su pra, however, deal with term ‘victim’ within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code. The Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in M/s. Tata Steel Limited, after examining the term  ‘victim’  within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code and also words “l oss” and “injury” within the meaning of Sections 23 and

44 of the Indian Penal Code with the help of the case law relied upon has held that words “l oss” and “injury” used  in  Section  2(wa)  are  synonymous  and  that  a person,  who  has  suffered  an  injury  i n  body  or  mind  or reputation or to his/her property, is a ‘victim’ within the meaning of Section ibid. No doubt, as per law laid down by the Full Bench, ‘victim’ is a person not only suffered with  an  injury  in  body  or  mind  or  to  the  property,  but reputatio n  also,  is  a  victim.  This  judgment  reads  as

follows:

जजमेंट  ज्‍यादा लंबी  होने  की  वजह  से  यहां  से  हटा  दी  गई  है

53.  I n  rest  of  the  judgments  cited  on  behalf  of the petitioner, the only legal question dealt with pertain s to  the  entitlement  of  a  victim  to  prefer  an  appeal against  a  judgment  of  acquittal  under  the  proviso  to Section 372 of the Code, qua which there is no t  much quarrel, hence need no further elaboration.

54.  The  question,  however,  arises  that  the petitioner before this Court is covered by the meaning so assigned to term ‘victim’ or not. The answer to this poser in all fairness and in the ends of justice would be in the negative  for  the  reason  that  irrespective  of  t he complaint Ext.PW- 37/A  having  been  made by him, he  is not  a  complainant  nor  the  case  is  registered  at  his instance. He at the most is a whistle blower.  On going through  the  reply  to  this  petition   filed  on  behalf  of accused- respondents  No.1  and  2 ,  t he  petitioner  is  an accused  in  criminal  cases  registered  vide  FIR  No.   3  of 2003 under Section s 465, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, FIR 15 of 2003 under Section s 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 – B of the Indian  Penal  Code  and  13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of Corruption  Act,  FIR  No.   27  of  2005  under  Section s  420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code and 13(2) of the Prevention  of  Corruption  Act, FIR  No. 11  of  2006  under Section s 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code and 13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  FIR  No.1  of 2004 under Section s 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, FIR No.4 of 2003  under Section s 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B of the  Indian  Penal  Code  and  13(2)  of  the  Prevention  of Corruption Act,  and FIR No.2 of 2004  under Section s 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and 13(2) of the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  in  Police  Station, Enforcement  North  Zone,  Dharamshala.  Therefore,  all these cases were registered against him at a time when accused – respondent No.1 was the Chief Minister of this State. No t  only this, but  three  Civil Suits bearing  No.5 of 2004, 5 of 2005 and 8 of 2005 have been  instituted  by the petitioner  against  accused -respondent  No.1.    It  can reasonably be believ ed that both accused – respondent

No.1  and  the  petitioner  are  inimical  to  each  other. Therefore,  the  possibility  of  he  having  initiated  these proceedings against the accused – respondents merely to wreak- vengeance  against  them  cannot  be  ruled  out. Although, the kind of “loss ” and “injury” as discussed by the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in  M/s. Tata Steel Limited   and Gauhati High Court in  Gouranga Debnath’s  case have not been suffered by the petitioner and at the most he can only be said to have suffered with  mental  injury  or  emotional  suffering  and  for  that matter even every citizen suffers such loss and injury if an offence  of  the  nature  already  committed  by  the accused- respondents  is  found  to  be  committed  by  a person occupying such a high position , yet keeping in view  that t he  petitioner  has  not  set  the  machinery  in motion in the capacity of a public spirited person and rather on account of  he being  inimical to the accused -respondents ,  h e cannot be termed as ‘victim’ within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the  Code nor competent to prefer an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code.

55.  Of  course,  charges  against  accused -respondents No.1 and 2 are that of corruption, therefore, if  any  “loss”  or  “injury”  including  the  emotional  loss  or mental injury is  cau sed by their cquittal ,  it  cannot only  be to a particular individual, like  the petitioner, but  also to  the public at large.  As already said, the term ‘victim’ is wide  enough and to be cons trued  liberally in a case having charges of corruption that too against a person occupying high position and at the helm of affairs. What to  speak  of  complainant  or  informant  hav ing   suffered loss  on  account  of  acquittal  of  an  accused  from  the charge  of  this  nature,  any  one  else  may  also  feel aggrieved, however,  this alone is not sufficient because under  the  proviso  to  Section  372  of  the  Code,  it  is  a victim  alone  competent  to  prefer  appeal.  In   this  case

since   the  petitioner  is  inimical  to  accused – respondents No.1  and  2,  therefore,  if  he  claims  himself  to  be  a ‘victim’ ,  it  is  difficult  to  believe.  I  am,  therefore,  in agreement with Mr. Cheema that the petitioner is not a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the Code for the reason that an informant or complainant has no right  to  prefer  an  appeal.  The  amendment  empow ers only a ‘victim’ and no ne else to  prefer an appeal,  not  a complainant or first informant  that too when the criminal proceedings  were  launched  consequent  upon  the investigation conducted on registration of FIR.   It is worth to mention here that in  National Commission for Women  v. State of Delhi and another, supra the Apex Court has not held the National Commission for Women as ‘victim’ i n – spite  of  that  case  being  that  of  atrocities/crime against women. To my mind in that case the National Commission was on better footing as compared to the petitioner in the case in hand.

56.  In another precedent cited by Mr. Cheema , Parmod Kumar, at whose instance the FIR  was registered , was not held to be a victim by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

57.  As  regards  Sheo  Nandan  P aswan’s   case supra, the same also does not deal with the questions arising in the present case at all.  In  this case,  learned Public Prosecutor moved an application for withdrawal of  prosecution,  which  was  opposed  by  Sheo  Nandan Paswan .    The  said  applicati on  was  allowed  and  the accused Dr. Jagannath Misra and others were ordered to be disch arged.  Sheo Nandan  Paswan filed a revision against the said order, which was dismissed by the High Court.  Sheo Nandan Paswan challenged the orders of learned  Courts  below  before  the  Hon’ble  Supreme Court.    Therefore,  the  questions  involved  in  Paswan’s case  were  entirely  different  and  dealt  with  the  locus standi  of  a  non – informant  to  challenge  an  order  of withdrawal  of  prosecution.    It  was  not  a  case  of an appeal against  acquittal.  The reference by the Hon’ble Supreme  Court  in  para  14  to  a  decision  of  the Constitution  Bench  in A.R.  Antulay’s   case  stating  that anybody could set the machinery of law in motion on commission of a crime and file the complaint, does not render  any assistance to the petitioner, who has to plead his case on the basis of a statutory right to file an appeal.

58.  In view of what has been said in para supra, it would not be improper to conclude that the right to file an  appeal  is  creature  of  statute  and  the  same  need determination with reference to the statutory provisions. In  a  case,  where  the  prosecution  is  launched  on  the basis of an FIR, it is only the State, which can prefer an appeal against the acquittal and not the complainant or  informant,  who  is  not  a  victim.  Therefore,  when  t he petitioner  is not proved to be  a victim, he  is not entitled to prefer an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the  Code  against  the  acquittal  of  the  accused-respondents. This takes us to the second question which pertains  to the  delay  as  occurred in  filing the  appeal.

Point No.2.

Brief b ackground:

59.  After having said that the petitioner is not a victim within the meaning of Section 2 (wa) of the Code and  as  such  not  competent  to  file  the  appeal,  it  is deemed appropriate to go into the question of limitation also.

60.  Now  coming  to  the  question  of  delay  the reasons  therefor  as  mentioned  in  paras  2  to  4  of  the petition read as follows:

“2.    That the applicant  received knowledge of  the  judgment  dated  24.12.2012  through Newspaper when he was attending to his sick wife  who  was  undergoing  treatment  for  a serious ailment at PGI, Chandigarh during the months of Jan- March,  2013.

3.    That  the  applicant   had  no  access  to the file record since he had not engaged any private counsel for prosecuting this case.  On receiving  knowledge  that  the  State  of Himachal  Pradesh  which  is  ruled  by  Sh. Virbhadra Singh (respondent No.1) and who is also  holding  charge  of  Home  Department would  not  let  the  prosecution  department  to file  any  appeal  again st  his  acquittal,  the petitioner  has  come  forward  as  a  ’victim’  to prefer  an  appeal  against  the  judgment  of acquittal.    The  competent  authority  to  give fitness/unfitness  certificate  for  filing  appeal  in the High Court was special public prosecutor, appoint ed in  the  case  by  present  Govt.  after declaration  of  result  of  State  Assembly  on 23.12.2012.  The said prosecutor was appointed by the Govt. headed by Sh. Virbhadra Singh by Home Department which intern was headed by Respondent No. 1.  Thus the prosecutor and the accused  became  one  and  the  same  having common  interest  not  to  peruse  the  case  in effectiveness.

The State Govt. department of Home is thus happy to oblige the accused in this case i.e. Respondent No. 1 and 2 by not filing any appeal  against  the acquittal  and  has  let  the period  of  limitation  expire  conveniently  for obvious reasons.  In this peculiar circumstance the  delay  in  filing  the  appeal  may  kindly  be considered in the light of above stated facts.

4.    That although Section 372 Cr.P.C does not  provide  a  period  of  limitation  for  filing  an appeal by the victim.  However, the period as provided under Article 114 of the Limitation Act has  bee n  made  applicable  by  certain decisions rendered by the Hon’ble High Courts in the country.  Full Bench of t he Gujarat High Court  in  the  case  of Bhavu  Ben  Dinesh  Bhai Makwana  vs.  State  of  Gujarat  Crl  Appeal  No. 238  of  2012 and 608  of  2012 has held that the period  of  90  days  should  be  a  reasonable period for the victim to file an appeal since the said period is the longest period of limitation for filing an appeal prescribed by the legislature.       This  view  is  based  upon  the  well recognized principles of criminal jurisprudence (Crime never dies), the  Maxim “nullum tempus qut locus occurrit regi” (Lapse of time is no bar to  Crown  in  proceedings  against  offenders)  is an age old rule embedded in criminal justice delivery system.  The public policy behind this rule is that a criminal offence is considered as a wrong  committed  against  the  State  and  the Society.    The  aforesaid  rule  of  prudence  has been duly acknowledged by the Parliament as it has prescribed no period of limitation for filing an appeal under proviso to Section 372 of the Code against an order of acquittal.  It would be  pertinent  to  mention  here  that  the applicant /appellant  has  got  the  Photostat copy of the judgment in the month of August, 2013.”

 

61.  The  response  on  behalf  of  accused-respondents  is  that  not  only  the  petition  but  also  theappeal is mala fide, filed with an ulterior motive to settle

 

score with them as he is under the impression that the criminal cases registered against him during the period 2003  to  2006  detailed  in  earlier  part  of  this  judgment were  registered  at  the  behest  of  accused – respondent No.1.    It  is  denied  that  the  petitioner  acquired  knowledge of passing judgment of acquittal during the period January- March, 2013.  As averred in reply to the peti tion, the case of the accused – respondents is that the petitioner appeared as PW- 37 on 24th December, 2012 in the Court.  The impugned judgmen t was announced on that  day   itself .    The  judgment  so  delivered  was  given wide  publicity  in  Print  and  electronic  media  on  25th December,  2012.    The  petitioner,  therefore,  was  fully aware  abou t  passing  of  the  judgment  on  24 th December,  2012  and  he  has  filed  the  appeal  due  to personal  grudge  and  vindictive  attitude against  the accused- respondents.  The petitioner’s claim that he is a victim  within  the  meaning  of  Section  2(wa)  was  also denied  being  wrong.    The allegations  against  the accused- respondents  and  other  functionaries  of  the State  are  stated  to  be  baseless,  malicious  and defamatory.    The  averments  that  accused – respondent No.1  having  taken  over  as  Chief  Minister  of  Himachal Pradesh  and  Minister  in  charge  of  Home  Department, the department of Home obliged him by not filing the appeal  against  his  acquittal,  have  also  been  denied being wrong.  In this behalf, it is submitted that since the competent authority had found the present a case of no evidence, hence rightly decided not to file appeal.  It is denied that no period of limitation is prescribed for filing an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code and  stated  that  the  period  of  limitation  as  provided under Article 114 of the Limitation Act is 90 days.  It is also denied  that  the  petitioner  got  Photostat   copy  of  the judgment  in  A ugust,  2013.    He  rather intentionally  and deliberately  suppressed  the  source  from  where  he  got the copy of the judgment.  The copy of the judgment annexed to the appeal is shown to have been prepared on  31st  December,  2 012.    Therefore,  according  to accused respondents, the petitioner has no right to file the  appeal.    Otherwise  also,  the  petition  discloses  no cause or reason muchless sufficient cause or reason for condonation of delay.

62.  The  respondent- State  in  preliminary submissions has come forward with the version that on receipt of the copy of judgment of acquittal, the District Attorney  has  examined  the  matter  and  opined  that  it was not a fit case for filing the appeal.  The opinion of District  Attorney  was  forwarded  to  Additional  Director General,  State  Vigilance  and  Anti – Corruption  Bureau, Himachal  Pradesh  and  was  examined  in  Vigilance Headquarters  by  Joint  Director  (Prosecution).    The  file along  with  the  opinion  of  Joint  Director  was  sent  to Additional  Chief  Secretary  (Home).    The  Home Department  has  forwarded  the  matter  to  Law Department for seeking opinion.  In the opinion of the Law  Department,  i t  was  a  case  of  no  evidence; therefore, a thoughtful and conscious decision not to file  appeal by the State  was taken.

63.  The petitioner should have been vigilant and approached  the  Court  within  the  reasonable  time  for redressal  of  his  grievances.    He  however,  remained negligent.    Otherwise  also,  the  present  being  a  police case, it is only the victim, who alone is competent to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code.  The  petitioner  in  this  case  is  not  a  victim,  hence  not competent to file the appeal.  It is denied that the Home Department has obliged the accused- respondent  No.1  by not filing the appeal against the judgment.  It is also denied that no limitation is prescribed for filing an  appeal under  the  proviso  to  Section  372  of  the  Code.    It  is submitted  that  the  procedure  as  prescribed  under Section 378 of the Code for filing the appeal against the acquittal  is  applicable  for  filing  the  appeal  under  the proviso to Section 372 of the Code also.

64.  In rejoinder to the reply filed on behalf of the accused/respondents,  while  pointing  out  the  alleged revengeful  and  vindictive  attitude  of  accused respondent  No .1  on  becoming  Chief  Minister  of  the State, the instances of initiation of criminal/departmental  proceedings  against  Dr.  D.S.  Minhas,  the  then  Director General of Police, Himachal Pradesh, who allegedly has ordered the registration of FIR No.27 of 2009 against the said  accused  and  monitored  the investigation conducted therein, Shri I.D. Bhandari, on the charges of snooping  upon  certain  politicians  now  in  power, Inspector Daya Sagar (Retd.), the Investigating Officer., who  allegedly  have  been   charged  with  re cording statements of Brigadier Kapil Mohan and Shri P.C. Jain, the  witnesses  examined  by  the  prosecution  in  the  trial against the accused/respondents allegedly falsely and Shri Hardesh Bisht, the then Superintendent of Police, SIU one  of  the  I nvestigating   Officer,  who  filed  final  report under  Section  173  of  the  Code  against  accused- respondents  No.1  and  2.    Therefore,  the  complaint  is that, it is not the petitioner, but the accused – respondent No.1, who is vindictive and inimical not only against the petitioner  but  also  against  all  those  who  any  how  or other  monitored/investigated  the  case  FIR  No.  27  of 2009,  which  was  registered  against  him  and  his  wife Pratibha Kumari, accused No.2 on taking over as Chief Minster of the State.

65.  The  representation  Annexure  P – 3  to  the rejoinder highlighting the alleged acts of vindictiveness on the part of accused – respondent No.1, made by Dr.D.S.  Mi nhas  to  Shri  Anil  Goswami,  Secretary  (Home)  to the  Government  of  India  against  the  communication made  by  respondent- State  for  se eking  permission  to charge- sheet   Dr.  Minhas.    Annexure  P – 4  (Colly.)   is  a communication addressed to Additional Superintendent of  Police,  Police  Station,  State  Vigilance  and  Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  Shimla-   2,   with  a  request  to  serve charge- sheet  upon  Shri  D aya  Sagar,  aforesaid  and Annexure P- 5 , copy of FIR No.5 of 2014 registered against Shri Hardesh Bisht, S uperintendent of  Police, SIU and Shri Daya Sagar, Inspector (Retd.), aforesaid  have also been pressed in to  service . Respective  Contentions  of  learned  Counsel  for the parties.

 

66.  Mr.  Deol,  learned  Senior  Advocate  has argued  that  the  petitioner  have  not  engaged  any counsel  in  the  trial  Court  nor  have  any  access  to  the record and decided to file appeal against the judgment of acquittal  only on  coming to know that respondent-State will not file the appeal. T herefore, the delay, which a ccording to Mr. Deol, is not inordinate and on the other hand the offence like immorality and corruption by the persons  occupying  high  position  the  term  sufficient cause ” ,  has  been  sought  to  be  liberally  construed. Therefore,  on  condonation  of  delay  the  appeal  has been sought to be entertained and decided on merits.

67.  In  order  to  buttress  the  arguments  so addressed,  Mr.  Deol,  has  placed  reliance  on  the

judgment of the  Apex Court in  State of Tamilnadu  v. N. Suresh Ranjan and others ,  2014  ( 1 )  RCR (Cr.) 572 .  While answering the issue of delay, the observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court are as under:-

“10.    The contentions put forth by Mr. Sorabjee are  weighty,  deserving thoughtful consideration and  at  one  point  of  time  we  were  inclined  to reject the  petition s filed for condonation of delay and dismiss the special leave petitions. However, on a second thought we find that the validity of the  order  impugned  in  these  special  leave peti tions has to be gone into in criminal appeals arising  out  of  Special  Leave  Petitions  (Criminal) Nos.  3810 -3811  of  2012  and  in  the  face  of  it,  it

shall  be  unwise  to  dismiss  these  special  leave petitions  on  the  ground  of  limitation.  It  is  worth mentioning here that the order impugned in the criminal  appeals  arising  out  of  Special  Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 3810-3811 of 2012, State of Tamil Nadu by Ins. of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption v.  N.  Suresh  Rajan  &  Ors.,  has  been mainly rendered, relying on the decision in State by  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,  Vigilance and Anti Corruption Cuddalore Detachment s. K. Ponmudi and Ors.(2007 -1MLJ-CRL.-100), which is  impugned  in  the  present  special  leave petitions. In fact, by order dated 3rd of January, 201 3, these petitions were directed to be heard along with the aforesaid special leave petitions. In such circumstances, we condone the delay in filing and re -filing the special leave petitions. ”

68.  The  reliance  has  also  been  placed  on  the judgment again tha t of the apex Court in State (NCT of Delhi)   v.   Ahme d  Jaan ,  2008  Cri.L.J,  4355.    In  this judgment, the  A pex Court, after taking note of the law laid  down  in  various  judicial  pronouncements  has elaborated the expression “sufficient cause ”  as follows:-

“……… The  expression  “sufficient  cause”  is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice  – that being the life -purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common  knowledge  that  this  Court  has  been making  a  justifiably  liberal  approach  in  matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the  expression  “every  day’s  delay  must  be explained”  does  not  mean  that  a  pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations  are  pitted  against  each  other, cause  of  substantial  justice  deserves  to  be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non -deliberate  delay.  There  is  no  presumption that  delay  is  occasioned  deliberately,  or  on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary  is  not  respected  on  account  of  its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and  is  expected  to  do  so.  Making  a  justice -oriented  approach  from  this  perspective,  there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the  State  which  was  seeking  condonation  and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants,  including  the  State  as  a  litigant,  are accorded  the  same  treatment  and  the  law  is administered in an even-handed manner. There is  no  warrant  for  according  a  step -motherly treatment  when  the  State  is  the petitioner.  The delay was accordingly condoned. ”

 

70.  Mr. Deol then placed reliance on a full Bench judgment  of  Gujarat  High  Court  in  State  of  Gujarat  v. Kaliashchandr a Badriprasad, 2001 (1) RCR (Cr iminal ) 162  and  on  that  of  Gauhati  High  Court  in  Gouranga Debnath’s case supra.

71.  Reliance has also been placed on a Division Bench  judgment  of  our  own  High  Court  in  Joginder Singh’s case cited supra.

72.  On  the  other  hand  Mr.  Cheema,  learned Senior Advocate has very fairly  submitted that he would have  not  raised  any  objections  to  the  plea  of condonation  of  delay,  but   the  petition,  according  to hi m,  does  not  disclose  sufficient  cause  and  rather  has been  filed  for  extraneous  consideration  with  mala  fide intention to harass the accused – respondents on account of enmity.  The very foundation that the petitioner came to  know  about  the  passing  of  impugne d  judgment somewhere in January-March 2013, on the face of it is false, as according to Mr. Cheema , the acquittal of the accused  followed  by  taking  over  as  Chief  Minister, Himachal Pradesh by accused- respondent No.1 on the next  day  i.e.  25th   December,  2012 ,  the  judgment  was given wide publicity  not only in  print media but  also in electronic media.

73.  The  day  when  the  judgment  was pronounced i.e. 24th  December, 2012 , the petitioner was present in the Court as a witness.  The copy of judgment is not certified  one.  The same is Photostat  copy having been prepared on 31st December, 2012. There being no explanation as to who  applied for the same  and when  its copy  was supplied, renders  the  explanation so coming forth  absolutely false.  The petitioner is a convict and  his convict ion   even  affirmed  by  the  High  Court  also,  of course  the  appeal  he  filed  is  pending  disposal  in  the Hon’ble Supreme  Court .  H is  perception  is  that  the criminal  cases  against  him  were  registered  at  the instance of accused – respondent No.1.    H e , according to Mr. Cheema, is inimical to the accused – respondent s  and betting  for  personal  interest  and  not  for  the  cause  of public at large.  Mr. Cheema has fairly conceded that the  Courts  have  wider  discretion  in  the  matter  of condonation  of  delay;  however,  the  discretion  should also be  exercised  judiciously depending upon the facts and  circumstances  of  each  case.    According  to  Mr. Cheema,  in  the  present  case  neither  any  plausible explanation  is forthcoming nor  is  sufficient cause  found to have been shown.  It has, t herefore,  been urged that the  delay  cannot  be  condoned.    Mr.  Cheema  has placed  reliance  on  the  judgment  of  Apex  Court in Oriental  Aroma  Chemical  Industries  Limited  v.  Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another (2010) 5 SCC, 459.   Anoth er judgment as relied upon is again that of Apex Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu (dead) by LRs . v. State  of Andhra Pradesh and others,  (2011)  4 SCC  363.   Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Apex Court in Maniben Devraj Shah  v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai,  (2012 ) 5 SCC 157.  74.  On  the  similar  lines  are  the  arguments addressed qua this aspect of the matter on behalf of the respondent – State.

Discussion and the conclusion drawn :

75.  The above stated factual and legal position takes  us   to  the  adjudi cation  of  the  question  of condonation of delay.  The present is a case where the delay of 96 days has occurred in filing the appeal.  The same has been sought to be condoned on the above grounds in the petition  discussed in para supra .

76.  It  is  well  settled  at  this  stage  that  a  party seeking the condonation of delay has to show   “sufficient cause ” warranting condonation of delay .

77.  As per the law laid down by the Apex Court in  Ahme d  Jaan’s  case  supra,  the  expression  sufficient cause’  should  be  interpreted  liberally  and  in  a meaningful manner to sub- serve the ends of justice.  Also that  the  expression  ‘every  day’s  delay  must  be explained’ should also be applied in a rational common sense by taking pragmatic approach to do substantial justice.

78.  To  the  similar  effect  is  the  ratio  of  the judgment again that of Apex Court  in  Lipok A.O’s  case supra relied upon in support of the case of the petitioner. Be that as it may, however, one should also not lo st sight of  the  fact  that  the  expiry  of  the  period  of  limitation prescribed for filing appeal/petition results in existence of a  valuable  right  to  the  opposite  party  and  such  right should  not  be  taken  away  by  condoning  the  delay without sufficient cause.  It is apt to make reference to the judgment of  A pex Court in  P.K. Ramachanderan v.  State  of  Kerala,  AIR  1998  SC,  2276.  It  is  held  in  this judgment  that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all rigors when the statute so prescribes and the  Courts have no powers to extend  the period of limitation on equitable grounds.

79.  Here  the  delay  has  been  sought  to  be condoned on the following grounds:

i )  the  petitioner  came  to  know  about  the judgment  under  challenge  somewhere  in January -March 2013 at such a time when he was  looking  after  his  ailing  wife  in  PGI Chandigarh;

ii )  the trial was being conducted by the public prosecutor and as he had not engaged any counsel hence not having the record of the case;

iii )  photocopy  of  the  judgment  was  made available to him in the month of August, 2013; and

iv )  on  coming  to  know  that  the  Home Department  with a  view  to  oblige accused respondent No.1, who by that time took over as  the  Chief  Minister  of  Himachal  Pradesh, not  opted  for  filing  appeal  against  the judgment of acquittal.

 

80.  Now  applying  the  law  as  discussed hereinabove  in  the  light  of  the  explanation  so forthcoming,  taking  a  lenient  view  of  the  matter  and pragmatic approach as well keeping in mind that the matter  should  normally  not  be  closed  merely  that  it  is time barred and the merit should not be made to suffer, this  Court  find s  itself  unable  to  agree  with  the explanation  as  set  forth  in  the  petition  for  seeking  the condonation of delay for the reason that the same does not  constitute  “ sufficient  cause ”  as  is  required  to  be shown for seeking the condon ation of delay.  In the case in  hand,  the  explanation  as  forth  coming  is  absolutely vague, cryptic and highly unbelievable.  The judgment under  challenge  has  been  passed  on  24th  December, 2012.  The petitioner on that day was very much present in  the  Court   bec a u se   he  appeared  as  one  of  the witnesses.    The  pronouncement  of  judgment  on  24th December,  2012, followed by oath taking ceremony of accused- respondent No.1 on the very next day, i.e., 25th December,  2012,  were  such  events ,  which  were   given wide  publicity  in  print  and  electronic  media.    T he petitioner, a  Himachali and being an IAS Officer (R etired) can reasonably be believed to have gone through the reports in print media and the news in electronic media regarding  acquittal  of  the  accused – respondent  by learned  trial  Court  on  24th  December,  2012.    The  plea  that  he  came  to  know  about  the  acquittal  of  the accused  respondents   somewhere  during  January -March, 2013 is not only palpably false but  vague, evasive and absurd also. Therefore,  on that basis the delay as occurred  in  filing  the  appeal  could  have  not  been condoned even if the appellant is held to be a ‘ victim ’having right to prefer appeal  against  the  judgment  of acquittal.  It   may  be  that  the  petitioner  was  not represented  by  a  counsel  nor  had  any  access   to  the records  of  the  case ;  however,  no  explanation  is forthcoming  to  show  as  to  how  and  what  efforts  he made to obtain the record and from whom.  It is also missing  that  he  applied  for  the ertified/uncertified copies of record on a particular day and the date  on which the same w as supplied to him.

81.  Surprisingly enough,  t he  petitioner  even does not  have  certified  copy  of  the  judgment  under challenge  because  it  is  only  a  photocopy  of  certified copy, which has been filed along with the appeal.  It is not known as to who applied for the same.  The stamp of copying  agency,  however,  reveals  that  the  certified copy was complete for delivery on 31st December, 2012 and was actually delivered on 23rd  February, 2013.  The petitioner is persuading this Court to exer cise discretion in his favour in the matter of condonation of  delay even  without  disclosing  the  name  of  the  person,  who  has supplied him the  P hotostat copy of the judgment.  There is no explanation as to why he himself did not apply for the certified copy of the judgment under challenge.  It is again absurd and evasive that he filed the appeal on coming to know that the Home Department with a view to  oblige  the  accused- respondent  No.1,  has  not preferred  appeal  against  the  impugned  judgment because  he  has  no t  disclosed  the  source  of  such information and also when he came to know about it.

The present is a case where there is nothing on record to show  that  since  when  the  limitation  start  running because  here  the  petitioner  has  neither  applied  for certified co py of the judgment nor is it his case that he came to know on a particular date about passing of the impugned  judgment  or  the  date  when  he  received information  qua the State Government having decided not  to  prefer  an  appeal  against  the  impugned judgment.   The explanation for condonation of delay as forth  coming  is  therefore,  neither  plausible  nor  cogent and reliable nor constitute sufficient cause.  The grounds raised rather are absolutely vague, absurd, cryptic and evasive also.  The present, therefore,  is  a case where  the petitioner has miserably failed to show sufficient causewarranting the condonation of delay  as occurred in filing the  appeal .    Therefore,  th is  is  no t  a  case  warranting liberal  construction  of  expression  “sufficient  cause”   nor any ground  for  taking  pragmatic  and  justice  oriented approach as held by the  A pex Court in Lipok AO’s and Ahme d  Jaan’s  case s   supra,  is  made  out .    The  present rather  is  a  case  where  sufficient  cause  has  not  been shown  nor  from  the  petition   any  ground  is  made  out warranting  condonation of  96 days ’   delay as occurred in filing the appeal.  The present rather is a case where an order condoning the delay  would amount to take  away a  valuable  right  having  accrued  in  favour  of  the accused- respondents  on  the  expiry  of  the  perio d prescribed for filing the appeal. I n the  given  facts and circumstances,  the  right   so  accrued  in  favour  of  the accused respondents cannot be taken away.

82.  Mr. Deol has also placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of Gujarat High Court in Kaliashchandra Bad raiprasad’s case supra. However, the law laid down therein  is not attracted in this case for the reason that the question referred to the full bench in that case was as to whether delay can be condoned without hearing an  accused  or  not,  which  has  been  answ ered  in affirmative  while  holding  that  the  delay  cannot  be condoned without hearing the accused and also that in a  case  of  acquittal  rather  the  delay  should  not  be condoned without sufficient cause .  The law laid down in this judgment is  hardly  of  any  help  to the  case  of  the petitioner  and  rather  substantiate  the  cau se  of  the accused- respondents for the reason that the petitioner has failed to show sufficient cause and as such the delay cannot be condoned.

83.  The  question  for  determination  before  a Division  Bench  of  Gauhati  High  Court  in  Gouranga Debnath’s  case was with regard to exclusion of time by extending  the  benefit  of  Section  470  of  the  Code  in certain  cases  because  in  that  case  initially  instead  of filing an appeal , revision petition was filed, which later on was sought to be withdrawn and dismissed as such.  It is

in this backdrop, it was held that on coming to know the revisional  proceedings  and  the  appeal  cannot  be pursued  together,  the  petitioner  having   withdrawn  the revision petition in good faith,  was  held  entitled to the benefit of Section 470 of the Code.  This, however, is not the point in issue in the case in hand.

84.  Coming  to  the  Division  Bench  judgment  of our own High Court in  Joginder Singh’s  case supra, it has been held that the procedure as prescribed for filing the appeal  under  Section  378  of  the  Code  is  applicable even to an  appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code.  Therefore, the limitation for filing an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 has been held to be 90 days.  Anyhow, there is no quarrel on this score as the petitioner himself submits in the  petition that the period of  limitation  prescribed  for  filing  appeal  under  Section 372 of the Code is 90 days.

85.  Now coming to the judgment of Apex Court in N. Suresh Ranjan’s  case,  supra, true it is that the delay of 2171 days as occurred in filing the appeal has been ordered to be condoned, however, on consideration  of the  facts  that  the  accused ,  a  former  Minister,  charge -sheeted  with  the  allegations  of  corruption  and  in possession  of  disproportionate  assets   in  his  own  name and  also  in  the  name  of  his  wife,  friend s   and  sons  as compared  to  their   known  sources   of  income ,  was discharged by the trial Court and the order affirmed by the High Court.  It is in the nature of the allegations  and gravity of the offence committed, the Apex Court , while holding that the validity of the order impugned should be gone into in appeal, has condoned the delay.

86.  The present is not a case of discharge of the accused- respondent s and rather they both have faced the  charge  and  it  is  on  appreciation  of  the  evidence available  on  record  learned  trial  Court  has  acquitted them from the charge.

87.  On  behalf  of  the  accused – respondents reliance has  been  placed on a  judgment  rendered in Oriental  Aroma  Chemical  Industries  Limited   v.  Gujarat Industrial  Development  Corporation ,  Lanka Venkateswarlu (dead) by LRs.  v.  State of Andhra Pradesh and  others  and   Maniben  Devraj  Shah  v.   Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai’s  cases  supra. The  ratio of these  judgments  is  also  that  w hile  considering  the petition  for condonation of delay the  Court should apply the law in a  pragmatic manner to  sub – serves the ends of justice and nothing beyond that.

88.  The crux of what has been said hereinabove, therefore, would be that the Courts have wide  discretion in  the  matter  of  condonation  of  delay,  however,  the same should be exercised judiciously and only in a case where sufficient cause is found to be shown.  In the case in  hand  there  is  nothing  to  infer  that  the  delay  is bonafide  and  occurred  owing  to  the  circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner.  The petitioner, for the reasons already recorded, seems to be inimical to accused- respondent  No.1.  The   so  called  v indictive attitude  of  the  said  respondent  towards  the  petitioner and other officers named in rejoinder to the reply  filed by accused- respondents is not a n  issue to be discussed and decided in the present petition being not the part of the record of this case. The  o fficers named in the rejoinder in case  feel   that  in  order  to  wreak – vengeance  against them,  they  have  been  victimized  by  accused respondent No.1 on account of they having  monitored/  investigated  the  case  registered against him vide  FIR No. 27  of  2009,  they  are  at  liberty  to  have  re course  to appropriate remedy available to them against the said respondent, in accordance with law. H owever, so far as this  petition  is concerned, the so called vindictive and revengeful attitude of the accused- respondents towards them  can not  be treated  a ground for condonation of delay.  Therefore, even if the petitioner had been held to be a  ‘victim’ and competent to file the appeal  under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code in  that event also the same  sh ould have not been entertained being time barred.

89.  In view of what has been said hereinabove no case for condonation of delay , as occurred in filing the  appeal ,  is  made  out.    Therefore,  the  petition  for seeking leave to appeal and the appeal itself being time barred  cannot  be  entertained.    Consequently,  the petition  being  without  any  merit  deserves  to  be dismissed.

Point  No. 3.

Brief background:

90.  Irrespective of the  findings that the petitioner is not a victim within the meaning of Section 2 (wa) of the Code, hence not competent to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code and that s ufficient cause  has  also  not  been  shown  for  condonation  of delay  of 96 days  as occurred in  filing the appeal,  it is deemed appropriate to examine the merits of the case also  because the Apex Court in Lipok A.O.’s case supra has  held  that  the  Court  should decide the  matters  on merits  unless  the  case  is  hopelessly  time  barred  and without merit.

Respective  c ontentions of learned Counsel.

91.  Mr.  Deol,  learned  Senior  Advocate  has mainly emphasized on the transcripts of the CD and also the statement Ex.PW- 22/A of  late Mohinder Lal, the then Director (Industries), Himachal Pradesh, who as per the transcripts  of  CDs  allegedly  spoken  with  respondents/  accused  and  late  Shri  K.N.  Sharma,  the  then  OSD  to accused respondent No.1 to prove the  acceptance of bribe  by  both  accused  from  Suresh  Neotia,  Vice President of M/s. Gujarat Ambuja Cement, P.C. Jain, its Chairman , late Shri Suresh Kapoor of Mohan Meakin and Piyush Jain, one of the  applicants for allotment of mini Steel Plant etc.  The report Ext .PW- 32/E and  PW- 33/H qua a nalysis of voice samples of both the accused have  also been pressed into service.  According to Mr. Deol, out of 4  points  formulated  by  learned  Special  Judge  for adjudication  no  point  pertains  to  the  CD  and  it  has vitiated the judgment under challenge, which according to  him  is  perverse,  hence  not  legally  sustainable.    It  is further  urged  that  tape  is  a  document  within  the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, hence such evidence  having  come  on  record  should  have  been relied  upon .  While  arguing  that  tap e- recorder  is admissible in evidence, reliance has been placed on  a judgment  rendered  by  a  Constitutional  Bench  of  the Apex Court in S. Partap Singh v.  State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC  72  and  on  the  strength  of  the  ratio  thereof, contended  that  like  any  other document  a  tape -recorder  is  also  document.  The  tape- recorder  version should  have  not  be en  ignored  merely  because  of capable  of  being  tempered  with  as  according  to  Mr. Deol for that matter any other document is also capable of being tempered with. Reliance  has also been placed on  another  judgment  of  the  Apex  Court  in  Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v.  The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147 ,  in  which  it  has  been  held  that  if  a  statement  is relevant and accurate tape – recorder of such  statement, is also relevant an d admissible.

92.  Mr.  Cheema,  while  repelling  the  arguments addressed  on  behalf  of  the  appellant- petitioner  has urged that Suresh Neotia of Ambuja Cement was neither associated  during  the  course  of  investigation  nor examined as a witness though  was available.   Shri S.S. Sodhi,  General  Manager  (Personnel),  Ambuja  Cement (PW – 18) though was examined, however, turned hostile

and not supported the prosecution case . Though charge is  that  Shri  Neotia  paid  a  sum  of  ` 3  lacs  to  accused respondent No.1 in Himachal Bhawan D elhi, however, no evidence  to  substantiate  the  same  is  produced.    It  is further  urged  that  again  there  is  no  evidence  that Brigadier  Kapil Mohan (PW- 26) of Mohan Meakin  through

one Suresh Kapoor and in consultation with PW – 30 H.N.

Handa  has  paid  a  sum  of `2,00,000/-   to  accused

Pratibha  so  that  on  account  of  non- installation  of

modified  Effluent  Treatment  Plant  (ET  Plant )  electricity

and  water  supply  to  Brewery  premises  are  not

disconnected.    Shri  P.C.  Jain,  PW- 25  of  M/s.  Gujarat

Ambuja Cement has also not supported the prosecution

case and turned hostile.  It is further argued that P.C. Jain

and  Brigadier  Kapil  Mohan  rather  filed  CWP

Nos .145  of  2011   and  1856  of  2011   in  this  Court  on  the

ground  that  they  never  made  the  statement  under

Section  161  of  the  Code   with  a  prayer  to  direct  the

investigating  agency  to  record  their  statements

correctly.  Major Vijay Singh Mankotia (PW – 21) allegedly

produced the audio- cassette before the Police and not

CD.    The  audio -cassette  was  also  ordered  to  be

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excluded from the evi dence by the trial Court in its order

framing charge, passed on 25

th

June, 2012 against the

accused person.

93.  In order to persuade this Court to discard the

audio – cassette/CD as legal and acceptable evidence,

reliance  has  been  placed  on  a  recent  judgment

r endered by the Apex Court in Anvar P.V. v.  P.K. Basheer

and others, AIR 2015  SC 180 . It is urged that no doubt an

electronic  record  is  a  documentary  evidence  under

Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, however, whether

it  is  genuine  or  not  is  a  question  to   be  taken  into

consideration  in  accordance  with  the  legal  provisions

and  also  in  the  given  facts  and  circumstances  of  the

case.

94.  Mr. Cheema, while disputing the authenticity

of  the  audio  cassette/CD  has  urged  that  the  report

Ex.PW – 32/E cannot be relied upon particularly when as

per  the  final  report  Ex.PW- 33/H  received  from  Forensic

Science  Laboratory,  it  was  not  possible  to  verify  the

authenticity of the audio recording in exhibits C/1 and

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A/1.  While inviting the attention of this Court to the reply

Ex.PW – 32/G , in response to the quarries of the laboratory

made  vide letter Ex.PW – 32/F, it is urged that the Forensic

Science  Laboratory  was  not  apprised  with  correct

position as at that time Mohinder Lal was also alive.

95.  Mr.  R.M.  Bisht,  learned  Deputy  Advocate

General has also urged that Audio cassette has already

been discarded by learned Special Judge being not a

material  piece  of  evidence.  Original  tape  was  neither

sealed  nor  seized.    According  to  Mr.  Bisht,  the  bribe

allegedly  was obtained  by  accused  responden ts  No.1

and 2 somewhere in 1989 – 90. At that time  CDs were not

in existence.  Therefore, according to Mr. Bisht, it is for this

reason  the  present  was  found  to  be  a  case  of  no

evidence and as such no appeal was preferred by the

respondent State.

Discussion and the conclusion drawn:

96.  Now  analyzing  the  rival  contentions  in  the

light  of  the  given  facts  and  circumstances  and  also

evidence available on record, admittedly CD (Compact

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Disk) was  not  in existence in the year 1989 – 90 when the

alleged recorded  talk  be tween  Mohinder  Lal  and

accused- respondent No.1, Mohinder Lal and accused -respondent  No.2  and  Mohinder  Lal  and  Kedar  Nath

Sharma qua exchange of money had taken place . Of

course, tape- recorder used to be there at that time and

as such the audio-cassette of  recorded talk was being

prepared. PW – 21 Major Vijay Singh Mankotia is not sure

that  packet  he  received  through  secret  source  was

audio – cassette  or  CD.  According  to  him,  when  the

document, which he understood audio- cassette played

in the press – conference, t he same was found to be a CD

made by someone else. Even if it was an audio- cassette

learned  Special  Judge  has  excluded  the  same  from

record being not admissible in evidence at the stage of

consideration  of  charge,  as  is  apparent  from  order

dated 25

th

June, 2012. If it was a CD, the same again is

not  admissible  in  evidence  for  the  reason  that  as  per

evidence  available  on  record  the  same  has  been

prepared on the basis of recording done on 1

st

January,

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1995.   Above all, CDs were not in existence during the

yea rs 1989- 90, when the occurrence took place.

97.  As noticed supra, the technology of CD was

not  in  existence  in  the  year  1989 – 90  when  accused-respondents  No.1  and  2  allegedly  received  bribe  and

committed offence. The CD being of 1

st

January, 1995

rather  is  bela ted  and  creation  of  undisclosed  and

unauthenticated  version.  No  evidence  is  forth – coming

that what was the device used for making the recording

in  the  CD.  Whether  such  device(s)  was  technically  in

order, again there is no evidence in this behalf. Who has

made the recording, is also missing. According to PW- 21

also,  the  CD  might  have  been  prepared  by  someone

else.

98.  The law on the question of admissibility of an

electronic document in evidence is no more res -integra

as  the  Apex  Court  in Anvar  P.V.  v.  P.K.  Basheer  supra

while  taking  note  of  the  provisions  contained  under

Sections  22A,  45A,  59,  65A  and  65B  of  the  Indian

Evidence Act has held as follows:

 

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“ 13.    Any documentary evidence by way of an

electronic   record  under  the  Evidence  Act,  in

view of Sections 59 and 65A,   can be proved only

in  accordance  with  the  procedure  prescribed

under  Section 65-B.  Section 65-B  deals  with  the

admissibility of the electronic record. The purpose

of  these  provisions  is  to  sanctify  secondary

evidence  in  electronic  form,   generated  by  a

computer. It may be noted that the Section  starts

with  a  non  obstante  clause.  Thus,

notwithstanding   anything  contained  in  the

Evidence Act,  any  information  contained  in an

electronic  record  which  is  printed  on  a  paper,

stored,  recorded  or  copied  in  optical  or

magnetic media  produced by a computer shall

be  deemed  to  be  a  document  only  if  the

conditions mentioned under sub-Section (2) are

satisfied,  without  further  proof  or  production  of

the  original.  The   very  admissibility  of  such  a

document, i.e., electronic record  which is called

as computer output, depends on the satisfaction

of  the  four  conditions  under  Section  65B(2).

Following  are  the  specified  conditions  under

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act:

 

(i )   The  electronic  record  containing  the

information  sho uld  have  been  produced  by

the  computer  during  the  period   over  which

the  same  was  regularly  used  to  store  or

process  information  for  the  purpose  of  any

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activity  regularly carried on over that period

by the person having   lawful control over the

use of that computer;

 

(ii )  The  information  of  the  kind  contained  in

electronic  record   or  of  the  kind  from  which

the  information  is  derived  was   regularly  fed

into  the  computer  in  the  ordinary  course  of

the said activity;

 

(iii )  During  the  material  part  of  the  said  period,

the  com puter  was  operating  properly  and

that even if it was not  operating properly for

some  time,  the  break  or  breaks  had  not

affected either the record or the accuracy of

its  contents; and

 

(iv )  The  information  contained  in  the  record

should be a  reproduction or derivation  from

the information fed into   the computer in the

ordinary course of the said activity.

 

14.    Under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act,

if  it  is  desired   to  give  a  statement  in  any

proceedings pertaining to an electronic record, it

is  permissible  pro vided  the  following   conditions

are satisfied:

(a)    There must be a certificate which identifies

the  electronic   record  containing  the

statement;

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(b)    The certificate must describe the manner in

which  the  electronic  record  was

produced;

 

(c)    The certificat e must furnish the particulars

of the device  involved in the production of

that record;

 

(d)    The  certificate  must  deal  with  the

applicable  conditions  mentioned  under

Section 65B(2) of the Evidence Act; and

 

(e)   The certificate must be signed by a person

o ccupying a   responsible official position in

relation  to  the  operation  of  the  relevant

device.

 

15.  It is further clarified that the person need

only to state  in the certificate that the same is to

the  best  of  his  knowledge   and  belief.  Most

importantly, suc h a certificate must   accompany

the  electronic  record  like  computer  printout,

Compact Disc (CD), Video Compact Disc (VCD),

pen drive, etc.,  pertaining to which a statement

is  sought  to  be  given  in   evidence,  when  the

same  is  produced  in  evidence.  All  these

s afeguards are taken to ensure the source and

authenticity,  which  are  the  two  hallmarks

pertaining to electronic record  sought to be used

as  evidence.  Electronic  records  being  more

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susceptible  to  tampering,  alteration,

transposition,  excision,   etc.  without  such

safeguards,  the  whole  trial  based  on  proof  of

electronic records can lead to travesty of justice.

 

16.    Only  if  the  electronic  record  is  duly

produced in terms of  Section 65B of the Evidence

Act,  the  question  would  arise  as  to  the

genuineness thereof and in that situation, resort

can  be  made  to  Section  45A – opinion  of

examiner of electronic  evidence.

 

17.    The Evidence Act does not contemplate or

permit the  proof of an electronic record by oral

evidence  if  requirements  under  Section  65B  of

the Evidence  Act are not complied with,  as the

law now stands in India.”

 

99.  The  larger  Bench  of  the  Apex  Court  has

overruled two – Judge Bench judgment of the same Court

in State (NCT of Delhi) v.  Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru,

(2005) 11 SCC 600  and has further held as follows:

 

“…Thus,  in  the  case of CD,  VCD,  chip etc.,

the  same  shall  be  accompanied  by  the

certificate in terms of Section 65B obtained at

the  time  of  taking  the  document,  without

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which the secondary evidence pertaining to

that electronic record is inadmissib le.”

 

100 .   In  the  case  before  the  Apex  Court  also

certificate in terms of Section 65B of the Evidence Act

was  not  produced  in  respect  of  the  CDs  relied  upon,

hence the Apex Court has held that the same cannot

be admitted in evidence.

101 .  In  this  case  the  condition s  specified  under

Section 65B (2) of the Evidence Act are  not at all satisfied

because nothing is there to show that the information in

the CD was being regularly stored or processed in the

computer or being regularly fed into the computer in the

ordinary course of activity and that the computer at the

relevant time was being operated properly or when not

operated properly the break, if any, not effected either

the record or the accuracy of its contents as well as that

the  information  in  the  electronic  record  (CD  in  the

present case) is reproduction of the information fed into

the computer in the ordinary course of the activity. The

certificate duly signed by a responsible official dealing

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with  the  operation  of  the  relevant  device  within  the

meaning  of  Section  65B(4)  of  the  Evidence  Act

identifying  the  statement  contained  in  the  CD,  the

manner  in  which  CD  was  produced,  device  used  for

preparation of the CD and its  production by PW – 21, who

does not know anything as to how the same is prepared

and  by  whom  and  w ith  what  device,  rendered  the

document in admissible in evidence. It is not known as to

who  played  the  CD  and  maker  of  the  statement  has

neither initialed the CD nor signed the transcript of the

contents thereof.  The  CD  during the course  of enquiry

and  investigation  remained  unsealed  throughout.  The

prosecution  story  reveals  that  it  was  unsealed  when

received  by  enquiry officer , remained unsealed during

the  course  of  enquiry  and  received  unsealed  by  the

Investigating  Officer  along   with other  records   of  the

case. The CD Ext.PW- 21/B, therefore, is not a document

to be relied upon in evidence.

102 .  The Forensic Science Laboratory  had sought

for  the  following  information  before  the  CD/audio

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cassette  is  analyzed  vide  letter  dated  9

th

September,

2008 (Ext.PW- 32/F):

“i)    Recording device with which questioned sample

was recorded is not provided which is essential to

authenticate the recordings;

 

ii)   How  and  when  it  was  recorded  may  be

informed?

 

iii)   The control samples may be provided as per the

transcription of the question sample.”

 

103 .    The  reply  (Ex.PW – 32/G)  to  the  letter

Ex.PW – 32/F supra given by the Superintendent of Police,

State  Vigilance  &  Anti  Corruption  Bureau,  reveals  that

the  Bureau  was  not  in  a  position  to  satisfy  the  three

conditions find mentioned in the letter Ext.PW – 32/F supra.

Meaning  thereby  that  neither  the  device  used  for

making  recording  of  CD  nor  origin  of  CD  nor  control

samples  as  per  transcription  of  the  CD  were  available

with the Vigilance Bureau.   True it is that in the opinion of

the  Forensic  Sc i ence  Laboratory  Ext.PW- 32/E  qua   the

voice – samples Ext.Q2 and Ext.S2 were found to be  that

of the  voice of accused respondent No.1, however, as

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regards  the  voice  samples  Ext.Q1  and  Ext.S1  in  the

opinion of the examiner, most probably the same were

that of t he voice of accused- respondent No.2. However,

the report Ext.PW- 33/H is fatal to the prosecution case for

the reason that as per the same  it w as not possible  for

the  expert s   to  verify  the  authenticity  of  the  tape -recording version  in the absence of phone c all details

and  original  recording  device.  The  evidence  as

produced,  therefore,  is  tainted.  The  prosecution  rather

has  withheld  the  material  required  by  the  Central

Forensic  Science  Laboratory  as  is  apparent  from  the

perusal of letter Ext.PW- 32/F and PW- 32/G. In the  report

Ext.PW- 33/H, CD is marked as C/1, whereas the audio-cassette as A/1. In the opinion of  the Scientific Officer

against Item No.9 “Results of examination  sub – paras vii.,

viii  and  ix”,  it  could  not  be  ascertained  that  the

conversation  in   C/1   and  A/1  was  recorded  at  the

instance  of  Mohinder  Lal  or  at that  of  the  accused -respondents.  Also  that  the  authenticity  of  the  audio

recording  in  Ext.C/1  and  A/1  could  not  be  verified  in

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absence  of  phone  call  details  and  original  recording

device.  Ext.C/2  and  V/1  the  specimen  of  voice

recording  were returned un – exami ned. Thus, there hardly

remains  any legal and acceptable evidence to arrive at

a conclusion that the deal of accused-respondents with

the representatives of Ambuja Cement, Mohan Meakin

Brewery,  and  Mini – Steel  Plant  etc.  had  taken  place

through Mohinder Lal and  that  they  obtained  the bribe

and extended undue favour to these industrial units.

104 .  The  law  laid  down  in S.  Partap  Singh ’s   and

Yusufalli  Esmail Nagree ’s cases supra cited on behalf of

the petitioner, is not at all attracted in the present case

because the point in issue in S. Partap Singh’s  case was

qua  the  tape -recording  version  capable  of  being

tempered with and it is in that background held that like

other  documentary  evidence  tape – recordi ng  can  also

be  tempered  with,  but  it  should  not  be  taken  to

conclude  that  the  tape- recordings  are  not  legally

admissible in evidence. In  Yusufalli Esmail Nagree’s case

it  is  held  that  a  tape – recorder  statement  if  recorded

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accurately is also relevant and admissible. As a matter of

fact, there cannot be any quarrel so far as the law  so

laid  down  in  the  judgments  supra   is  concerned ,

however,  for  the  detailed  reasons  hereinabove,  in  the

case  hand,  CD/audio – cassette  cannot   at  all  be

considered as legal and accep table evidence.

105 .  Much  has  been  said  about  the  statement

Ext.PW- 22/A  of  late  Mohinder  Lal.  The  same  reads  as

follows:

“I have heard the CD today purported to have

been converted from a tape recorded sometime

in the year 1989. At that time there was no CD

but only Tape Recorders were available. I do not

know as to how and where it has been recorded.

The contents of the CD contain prima facie my

conversation with the then Chief Minister, his wife

and Shri K.N. Sharma etc. Prima facie the voice in

the  CD  is  mine  and  as  far  as  I  remember  the

conversation  has  taken  place.  As  regards  the

names of the persons and the detail thereof the

same must have recorded by Rani Sahiba and

may  be  obtained  from  her.  The  persons,  who

made contributions as far as I remember, were

sent  to  the  Chief  Minister’s  house  on  various

occasions  and  the  present  CD  is  a  version  of

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those occasions which happened and appears

to  have  been  recorded  on  various  dates  and

made into one tape/CD. I am available for any

further clarification based on my memory at any

time as and when needed, as the matter relates

to long time back.”

 

106 .    It is seen that the CDs as per this statement

were not available at that time. Mohinder Lal was not

aware of as to where it was recorded. Although, he has

said that so far  his memory, it was his conversation and

the  person  who  made  contributions  as  far  as  he

remembered were sent to the Chief Minister’s house on

various  occasions  and  the  recording  also  made  on

various  dates,  but  made  into  one tape/CD.  When the

CD/audio – cassette  has  already  been  discarded,

therefore,  the  statement  of  late  Shri  Mohinder  Lal  is

hardly of any help to the prosecution case.  He was not

ava ilable to make statement in the  Court. Though PW- 22

Dr. Kavindra Lal, his son, has been examined to prove  this

document,  however,  t he  evidence  as  has  come  on

record by way of his statement is  also hear- say hence

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not  admissible  in  evidence.  Above  all,  the  statement

Ext.PW- 22/A is vague. The maker of the statement late

Shri Mohinder Lal  could not recognize his voice with all

certainty and rather said that prima facie the voice in

the CD was his voice . It is, therefore, not safe to place

reliance on such a statement. Nothing can be made out

therefrom  qua  the  demand,  offer  or  acceptance  of

bribe by the accused persons. He repeatedly used the

words “as far as I remember”, “appears to have been

recorded”. The statement, therefore, is absurd also and

no findings can be recorded on such statement.

107 .    There are contradictions in the statements of

PW- 31 I.D. Bhandari, the then Additional Director General

of Police and PW-32 A.P. Singh, Superintendent of Police

because as per the version of former, Mohinder Lal was

interrogated by PW – 32 A.P. Singh. He has not said that

Mohinder Lal was interrogated in his presence, however,

as per version of PW – 31 he was called by the Additional

Director  General  of  Police  to  his  office  and  before

recording the statement of Mohinder Lal by him CD was

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already  heard  by  Mohinder  Lal.  The  statement  of

Mohinder  Lal  has  not  been  endorsed  by  any  police

officer. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court

the  statement  Ext.PW – 22/A  cannot  be  held  to  be

admissible in evidence by any stretch of imagination.

108 .  If the CD/audio cassette is excluded from the

record, there hardly remains any evidence connecting

the  accused – respondents  with  the  commission  of

alleged  offence.  The  charge  under  Section  7  of  the

Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  against  accused-respondent  No.1  is  that  while  the  Chief  Minister  of  the

State  of  Himachal  Pradesh ,  he  has  obtained  ` 2  lacs

towar ds  illegal  gratification  from  Shri  Suresh  Neotia  of

M/s.  Gujarat  Ambuja  Cement  for  clearance  of  its

cement plant at Darlaghat.    The allegations are that Shri

Suresh  Neotia,  Chairman  of  M/s.  Gujarat  Ambuja

Cement,  accompanied  by  PW- 25  P.C.  Jain  met

accused- respondent  No.1,  the  then   Chief  Minister  of

Himachal  Pradesh  in  Himachal  Bhawan  at  New  Delhi

and  Shri  Neotia  paid  a  sum  of `2  lacs  to  the  said

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accused- respondent  for  early  installation  of  the  plant.

Surprisingly  enough,  said  Shri  Suresh  Neotia  has  neither

been associated during the course of investigation nor

examined as a witness.

109 .  Shri  P.C.  Jain,  of  course,  has  stepped  into

witness box as PW – 25, however, has not at all supported

the prosecution case, as according to him he never met

the  then  Director  (In dustries)  in  the  year  1989  nor  any

political executive , head of the State , in connection with

seeking per mission of IPARA  (Industrial Projects Approval

and Review Authority)  nor entered into the financial deal

with  any  functionary  of  the  State  in  connection  with

seeking  such  permission.    He  had  not  talked  with  the

Chief  Minister  also.  He,  therefore,  turned  hostile  to  the

prosecution.  In  his  cross – examination  conducted  by

learned Public Prosecutor though it is admitted that Shri

Suresh Neotia was the Chairman of M/s. Gujarat Ambuja

Cement, however, it is denied that he accompanied by

Shri  Suresh  Neotia  met  accused- respondent  No.1  in

Himachal Bhawan at New Delhi and that said Shri Neotia

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paid  a  sum  of  ` 2  lacs  to  the  said  accused  for  early

installation of the c ement plant. When confronted with

his statement Ext.PW- 39/E recorded under Section 161 of

the Code, he has denied making of such statement. It is

also denied that he went to Holly – Lodge , the residence

of the Chief Minister and met with accused Pritibha Singh

to whom he paid  `3 lacs  for seeking early clearance of

IPARA  permission .    In a nutshell , Shri  P.C. Jain has denied

all  the suggestions  put  to  him  in  his cross- examination,

being wrong.    In his further cross – examination conducted

by learned defence Counsel he rather stated that writ

petition Ext.RX was filed by him when he came to know

from  his  son  about  the  contents  of  the  statement

recorded by the police.    The writ petition was filed on the

ground that his statement was wrongly recorded by the

police.   Therefore, the charges under Sections 7 and 11

of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  against  accused-respondent No.1 are not at all proved.

110 .  PW- 18  S.S.  Sodhi,  General  Manager

(Personnel) of M/s. Gujarat Ambuja Cement tells us that

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P.N. Neotia was the Chairma n of M/s. Gujarat Ambuja

Cement  and  its  head  office  was  at  Bombay. Shri  P.C.

Jain was also Chairman of the Company.    He, however,

expressed his inability to state that it is  Shri  P.C. Jain, who

had  been liaisoning  with the State Government at the

time of i nstallation of the cement plant of the Company

at  Darlaghat.     He  was  also  declared  hostile  and  his

version in cross- examination also remained the same. In

his  cross- examination  conducted  by  learned  defence

Counsel , he expressed his ignorance as to whether  Shri

P.C. Jain was Pres ident or Senior Vice President because

according to him, Mr. Jain  retired well before he joined

duties at Darlaghat.

111 .  Now coming to the charge against accused-respondent Pritibha Singh that she received  ` 2 lacs from

one Suresh Kapoor, an employee of M/s. Mohan Meakin

Limited and ` 3 lacs from PW- 25 P.C. Jain of M/s. Gujarat

Ambuja  Cement  Plant  for  exercising  influence  on  her

husband accused – respondent Virbhadra Singh  to ensure

early  clearance  of  IPARA  in  favour  of  M/s.  Gujarat

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Ambuja a nd to ensure that electricity and water supply is

not  stopped  to  the  premises  of M/s.  Mohan  Meakin

Limited   on  account  of  non – installation  of  modified  ET

Plant,  there  is  again    no  evidence  to  substantiate  the

same  for  the  reason  that  Shri  Suresh  Kapoor  of  M/s.

Mohan Meakin Limited, on account  of his death , was not

available to make statement  in the Court and as regards

Shri  P.C. Jain, as noticed supra, he has not supported the

prosecution case at all.

112 .  PW- 30 H.N. Handa also turned hostile to the

prosecution because  as  per  his  version,  he  never

received  any  notice  from  the  State  Pollution  Control

Board  for  installation  of modified ET  Plant  at  Solan,  as

according  to  him,  such  plant  was  already  installed.

When cross- examined by learned Pubic Prosecutor, he

expressed  his  ignorance  that  in  the  year  1983  State

Pollution Control Board made correspondence with the

Company qua installation of new modified ET Plant and

ordered disconnection of water and electricity supply if

the plant is not installed.    It is also deni ed that on receipt

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of the said notice , he contacted Brigadier Kapil Mohan,

the  Managing  Director  of  the  Company  and  that  he

asked him to contact Mohinder Lal (since dead) and act

accordingly.    It  is  also  denied  that  he  was  asked  by

Mohinder Lal to pay `2 lacs to accused- respondent No.2

in Hol l y – L odge and that he handed over  `2 lacs to Suresh

Kapoor  for  payment  thereof  to  accused – respondent

No.2.    It is also denied that said Shri Suresh Kapoor had

paid  the  money  to accused- respondent  No.2  and

informed  him  wh en  came  back  to  Solan.    It  is  also

denied that he informed Mohinder Lal qua the payment

so made and it is thereafter no notice qua installation of

modified  ET  Plant  was  made.   He  has  denied  his

statement  Ext.PW- 39/C  having  been  recorded  by

Inspector Daya Sagar, as per his version .

113 .  Now  coming  to the  statement  of  Brigadier

Kapil  Mohan,  Managing  Director  of  Mohan  Meak in

Private Limited, he has stepped into the witness box as

PW- 26. He was also turned hostile to the prosecution, as

according  to  him,  though  notice  for  installation  of

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modified  ET  Plant  was  received  in  the  year  1983  from

State Pollution Control Board,  yet  he never  asked H.N.

Handa  (PW- 30)  to  contact  Mohinder  Lal,  the  then

Director  of  Industries.  Therefore,  he  was  also  cross-examined  by  learned  Pu blic  Prosecutor,  but  in  sundry

because  nothing  material  lending  support  to  the

prosecution  case  could be  elicited. He has  denied his

statement  Ext.PW- 39/D  having  been  recorded  by

Inspector Daya Sagar (PW -39) at Gaziabad.   He has also

denied his relations w ith accused – respondent Virbhadra

Singh. It is denied that he asked PW- 30 to make payment

to accused – respondents,  if required to be  made in order

to  avoid  the  installation  of  modified  ET  Plant.  It  is  also

denied that the Company made the payment of money

to  State Government functionaries and not counted for

the same in the accounts. According to this witness , he

had filed  petition  Ext.RS for  seeking a direction to record

his statement in a proper manner.

114 .  PW- 38 Amar Singh has also not supported the

prosecution case that late Suresh Kapoor disclosed him

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about  he  having  brought  ` 2  lacs  for  being  paid  to

accused- respondent No.2 Pratibha Singh. He has denied

that he made statement Ext.PW -39/B.

115 .  Now coming to the evidence as has come

on record by way of the testimony of PW- 21 Major Vijay

Singh  Mankotia,  the  star  prosecution  witness,  his

statement also not lends any support to the prosecution

case.    He  rather is  turned  hostile  to  the  prosecution.

According to him, original audio – cassette, he played in

the  press  con ference  is  Ext.PW- 21/B  and  that   in  his

opinion  the  same  is  the  original  one .    Except  for

Ext.PW- 21/B,  he  allegedly  had  another  audio – cassette

Ext.PW- 21/C and that in his opinion voice in the audio -cassette was that of  accused Virbhadra Singh, accused

Pritabha  Singh,  Mohinder  Lal  and  Kehar  Nath  Sharma.

When  further  cross- examined  by  learned  defence

Counsel  while  stating  that  audio- cassette  Ext.PW – 21/B

was  not  prepared  in  his  presence  and  that  he  is  not

aware as to who and where it was prepared and that

the   CDs/audio – cassette  were played extensively in   the

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election  at  Hamirpur  by  Bhartiya  Janta  Party,  has

demolished  the  entire  prosecution  case.  His  admission

that no identification mark was put by him on the audio -cassette  recovered  by  the  police  from  him  and   that

CD/audio – cassette  like  Ext.PW- 21/B  are  being  largely

manufactured  and  distributed,  render  the  authenticity

and genuineness of this document highly doubtful.    The

statement  of  PW – 21  only  reveals  that  there  was  an

audio – cassette  he  received  from  secret   source,

however,  his  statement  is  not  suggestive  of  that

Ext.PW- 21/B  is  the  same  audio- cassette  he  produced

before the police.   He  has simply produced the  same

before the police.   He has not said anything  as to how

and  at  what  time as  well  as  about the  i dentity  of  the

person,  who  has  prepared  the  same.    Therefore,  the

audio – cassette/CD does not stand for the test of legal

scrutiny, as discussed in detail  in this judgment in paras

supra.

116 .  Another  star  witness  is  none- else  but

petitioner S.M. Katwal, who has stepped into the witness

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box as PW- 37. He also tells us about one CD  he found to

have  been kept in an envelop in his letter – box and on

hearing the same he found the voices of Mohinder Lal,

Virbhadra Singh and Pratibha Singh therein. He has also

said that since he remained posted in various capacities

in the Government, therefore, was well conversant with

their voices. He made the  petition  Ext.PW – 37/A to Station

House  Officer,  State  Vigilance  and  Anti  Corruption

Bureau, Shimla. He also filed writ petition  Ext.PW- 37/B in

the High Court. The CD was handed over by him to his

lawyer.  His  testimony  in  cross – examination  is  very

interesting as he expressed his inability to tell that the CD

received by him was original or copied one, when the

same was received. In  the complaint Ext.PW – 37/A there

is no mention of CD , which he admits  to be correct and

tells us that the report he made  to the police  was based

on  the news published  in a section of  newspapers .    He

further tells us that he did not put any identification ma rk

on the CD and that the CD given by him to the lawyer is

still in existence or not , he cannot tell .   He also expressed

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his  ignorance  about  the  enquiry,  if  any,  made  by  the

police from him qua the CD.   Nothing incriminating has

come in the statement of the petitioner connecting the

accused- respondents with the commission of offence.

117 .  The  testimony  of  PW – 31  and  PW- 32,  as

already  noticed,  is  contradictory  on  certain  aspects

because  according  to  Shri  I.D.  Bhandari  (PW- 31),  Shri

Mohinder Lal might have been called by  Shri  A.P. Singh

(PW – 32) for the purpose of interrogation and  that he did

not associate himself with any enquiry, whereas as per

the  version  of  PW- 32,  Mohinder  Lal  was  called  by  the

then ADGP (PW -31) and it is PW- 31 who called Mohinder

Lal to his off ice.    When he reached in the office of ADGP,

the  CD  was  already  heard  by  the  ADGP  (PW- 31)  and

Mohinder  Lal.  PW- 32,  no  doubt,  tells  us  that  CD  was

seized  by  him;  however,  it  was  not  original.    He  had

asked  Santosh  Patial,  Superintendent  of  Police,  State

Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau, Dharamshala to

seize the CD, but he had sent audio – cassette in a sealed

condition.     He  admits  that  original  audio – cassette  was

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never  seized  and  sent  to  Forensic  Science  Laboratory.

On  the  CD,  no  identification  mark  was  th ere  and  the

same remained unsealed during the course of enquiry

he  conducted.     The  statement  of  PW – 32,  who,  as  a

matter of fact, conducted the enquiry in this matter also

not  substantiate  the  prosecution  case,  in  any  manner

whatsoever.   The  testimony  of  th is  witness  and  that  of

PW- 31  I.D.  Bhandari  and  PW- 21  Major  Vijay  Singh

Mankotia rather are contradictory with each other.

118 .  PW- 39  is  Daya  Sagar,  who  has  partly

investigated  the  case.  Though,  as  per  his  version,

statements Exts.PW- 39/A to PW – 39/E of S/Shri Vijay Singh

Mankotia,  Amar  Singh,  H.N.  Handa,  Kapil  Mohan  and

P.C.  Jain,  were  rightly  recorded  by  him,  however,  as

noticed supra the above witnesses have stated in one

voice that  their  statements  were  not  recorded  by  the

police as per their version and they rather resiled from

the statements so recorded.    Therefore, PW – 39 is also of

no help to the prosecution case.

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119 .  As  discussed  hereinabove,  the  testimony  of

the  material  prosecution  witnesses  also  not  lends  any

support  to  the  prosecution  case.  PW – 25  P.C.  Jain  and

PW- 26  Brigadier  Kapil  Mohan  rather  have  filed  two

separate writ petitions in this Court on the ground that

their  statements  in  this  case  have  been  recorded

wrongly by the police.   The writ petitions were disposed

of by a Division Bench of this Court with the observations

that  the  appropriate  course  available  to  them  was  to

have  moved  to  senior  officers  for  recording  of  their

statements. Consequently, petition  Ext.RZ was moved by

PW- 25 with a request to record his statement correctly.

120 .  The  remaining  prosecution  witnesses  are

formal in nature. The evidence as has come on record

by way of their testimony could have at the most been

used  as  link  evidence  had  the  prosecution  been

otherwise  able  to  bring  guilt  home  to  the  accused

persons  beyond  all  reasonab le  doubt.   Therefore,  on

merits  also,  no  case  is  made  out  to  interfere  with  the

impugned judgment.

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Point No.4:

Brief Background and respective contentions :

121 .  On  the  question  of  fairness  of  trial,  the

complaint  is  that  after  declaration  of the  result  of  the

Hi machal Pradesh Legislative Assembly Election on 20

th

 

December, 2012 the proceedings in the trial  witnessed

tremendous  speed   and  that  about  20  witnesses  were

given up  by the prosecution thereafter, i.e., during the

period 20

th

December, 2012 to 24

th

December, 2012 . It is

further  contended  that  special  Prosecutor  conducting

the  trial  on  behalf  of  the  prosecution  was  abruptly

replaced by a new Prosecutor. Judgment was delivered

on a day before accused – respondent No.1 took over as

Chief  Minister  of  Himachal  Pradesh.  The  evidence

available  on  record  has  not  been  discussed.  Mr.  Deol

has, therefore, urged that the judgment under challenge

has been passed in haste to the reasons best known to

learned  Special  Judge.    The  same  allegedly  being

perverse has been sought to be quashed.

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122 .  On the other hand, Mr. Cheema has urged

that  who  is  the  material  witness,  given  up  by  the

Prosecutor remained unexplained .  N othing to this effect

is forth- coming on record. Also that the present being a

case under the Prevention of Corruption Act otherwise

was also required  to  be  decided  at  the  earliest.  It  is

pointed out from the record that the charges against the

accused  were  framed  in  the  month  of  June,  2012,

whereas  the  impugned  judgment  passed  on  24

th

 

December, 2012. The present, therefore, is said to be not

a case, where it can be said that learned Special Judge

has delivered the judgment in a haste.    It is rather the

prosecution  not  proceeded  in  the  matter  in  a  fair

manner and irrespective of technology of CD was not

available in the year 1989 by hook and crook believing

the  audio – cassette to be  a genuine document, booked

both the accused falsely in the case. The investigation

according to Mr. Cheema has not been conducted in a

fair and impartial manner.

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– 122 –

Discussion and conclusion drawn:

123 .  On  analyzing  the  arguments  addressed  on

both sides, true it is that on and after declaration of the

result of Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly on 20

th

 

December,  2012,  24  witnesses  were  summoned  for

examination. Out of the eight witnesses summoned for

20

th

December, 2012 only one witness H.N. Handa could

be recorded whereas statement of Rajinder Tarlokta was

deferred for the next day, i.e., 21

st

December, 2012 and

one witness was given up by the prosecution. Remaining

five  not  present  on  that  day   were  ordered  to  be

summoned for 22

nd

December, 2012 , i.e., after one day .

On 21

st

December, 2012, out of eight witnesses plus PW

Rajinder Tarlokta aforesaid, statements of  three including

Rajinder Tarlokta were recorded and four were give up,

whereas PW S.K.  Jain was not present on   that day.    There

is nothing in the order passed on 21

st

December, 2012

that PW A.P.  Singh summoned for that day was present

or not.    Similarly on 22

nd

December, 2012, out of eight

witnesses,  five  including  aforesaid  A.P.  Singh  were

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– 123 –

recorded  and  six  given  up.  PW  Daya  Sagar  being

Investigating  Officer  was  ordered  to  be  examined  on

24

th

December,  2012  along   with  remaining  PWs  S.M.

Katwal  and  Amar  Singh  Thakur.  On  that  day,  i.e.,  22

nd

 

December,  2012,  though  learned  Public  Prosecutor

prayed for a long date, yet learned Special Judge while

recording   that   only  PWs S.M.  Katwal  and  Amar  Singh

Thakur are left to be examined,  adjourned the trial to 3

rd

 

day, i.e., 24

th

December, 2012. On that day, statements

of  the  remaining  three  witnesses  were   recorded.  The

statements  of  both  accused  under  Se ction  313  of  the

Code  were also  recorded  and  on  hearing arguments,

the judgment was also delivered on the same day.

124 .  Be it stated that out of total  59 witnesses, 24

were  ordered  to  be  summoned  on  the  above  three

dates  and  those  witnesses  not  present  on  a  particular

date were ordered to be summoned either on the next

day or a day next to it as discussed hereinabove. The

trend, however, was not so before 20

th

December, 2012.

For example on 16

th

November, 2012 PW Amar Singh was

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– 124 –

not  present,  whereas  PW  Rajinder  Tarlokta  though

present but not produced the record. The case  though

was adjourned  to  17

th

December,  2012 ,  i.e.,  after  one

month  for  recording  remaining  prosecution  evidence

including that of S/Shri Amar Si ngh and Rajinder Tarlokta,

however, they both were not summoned or bound down

for  17

th

November,  2012  and  rather  Amar  Singh  was

recorded  on  24

th

December,  2012  whereas  Rajinder

Tarlokta  on  20

th

/21

st

December,  2012.  Again  on  9

th

 

November,  2012  when  PW  Nagin   Nanda  could  not

appear despite service, no order is passed on that day

qua  his  appearance  on  the  next  date ,  i.e.,  16

th

 

November,  2012.  The  order  passed  on  7

th

November,

2012 reveals that some of the witnesses were not present

on that day. Though, the case was already listed for 8

th

 

and 9

th

November, 2012 also for recording prosecution

witnesses, however, such witnesses were not ordered to

be  summoned/produced  for  the  next  day  or  day

thereafter.

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– 125  –

125 .  True it is that  the cases in respect of offence

under  Prevent ion  of  Corruption  Act,  1988  need

expeditious  hearing and disposal.  The cases under  the

Act are, otherwise also , being fast- tracked and taken up

for hearing on priority basis , both at the High Court and

District Courts levels, under the Mission Mode Program me

and instructions/guidelines issued by the Supreme Court

and also the High Court from time to time.    Even  under

sub – section  (4)  of  Section  4  of  the  Prevention  of

Corruption Act also a case registered under the Act  is

required to be  heard  on day- to – day ba sis.    But sudden

change in the trend of proceedings in the case in hand

during  the  period  from  20

th

December,  2012  to  24

th

 

December, 2012 casts a doubt that learned trial Judge

being guided by instructions issued by the High Court or

the provisions ibid under the Act proceeded in the case

to dispose it of expeditiously because had it been so the

speed in the proceedings observed during the period of

four days, i.e., 20

th

December, 2012 to 24

th

December,

2012, the  speed   should have been the same  right from

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– 126 –

very beginning. Anyhow, there being nothing on record

that  learned  trial  Judge  did  so  for  some  extraneous

consideration  or  with  oblique  motive  to  help  the

accused- respondent s  and  particularly  accused-respondent  No.1   to  take  over  as  Chief  Minister  of

Himach al  Pradesh  after  declaration  of  the  result  of

general  election  o f  Himachal  Pradesh  Legislative

Assembly on 20

th

December, 2012 , no further discussion

on this aspect of the matter is required.

126 .  Although, nothing is there on record that Shri

J.L. Sharma, S pecial Public Prosecutor was removed and

rather he was very much in position upto 20

th

December,

2012,  as  is  apparent  from  his  presence  marked  in  the

zimni  order  passed  on  that  day.  He,  however,  was

replaced on the next day, i.e., 21

st

December, 2012 by

Shri Ashwani Dhiman, Public Prosecutor, whereas on 24

th

 

December, 2012, the day when the proceedings in the

trial concluded and  the judgment announced, the State

was  represented  by  Shri  L.S.  Negi,  learned  Public

Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor  though was r eplaced

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– 127 –

on  and  after  20

th

December,  2012 ,  h owever,  what

prejudice thereby is caused to the petitioner , Mr. Deol

has failed to spell out during the course of arguments.

The complaint that on and after 20

th

December, 2012 , 20

witnesses  were  ordered  to  be  given  up,  is  not  correct

because out of 24 witnesses summoned for three days,

i.e.,  20

th

to  22

nd

December,  2012  and  also  for  24

th

 

December,  2012,  13  were  recorded  whereas  11  were

given up.

127 .  I find no substance in the submissions that the

witnesses were given up for extraneous consideration or

with  malafide  intention  to  help  the  accused  persons.

Otherwise also, it is for the Public Prosecutor to decide as

to  out of the witnesses cited in the final report,  who is to

be examined  in the Court  and who is to be given up.

Otherwise also, Mr. Deol  again could not point out during

the course of arguments as to what prejudice has been

caused  to  the  petitioner  or  for  that  matter  the

prosecution from the decision of the Public Prosecutor to

give  up 11  witnesses  or  why  the  s aid  witnesses  were

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– 128 –

required to be recorded and  how such evidence  would

have been  material for the prosecution case.

128 .  True it is that learned trial Judge has avoided

the elaboration of the evidence available on record at

the pretext that it was not require d to do so. Support in

this regard has been drawn by learned trial Judge from

various  judicial  pronouncements  made  by  the  High

Courts  including  the  Apex  Court.  The  impugned

judgment  reveals that the evidence has not out -rightly

been  ignored,  but  learned  tr ial  Judge  has  referred  to

and  discussed  the  relevant  evidence  as  and  where

required to do so. Mr. Deol, therefore, failed to persuade

this Court to take a different view of the matter on this

score. Otherwise also, for want of legal and acceptable

evidence   connecting  both  the  accused  with  the

commission of the alleged offence even if  it is held that

fair trial has not been conducted, will hardly  be  of any

help  to  the  petitioner,  who  being  not  victim,  is  not

competent to file the appeal and even failed to show

sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

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– 129 –

129 .  The investigation of the case seems to be not

conducted  in  a  fair  manner  for  the  reason  that

irrespective of technology on CD was not in existence in

the  year  1989- 90,  the  same  has  been  made  basis  for

registrat ion of a case against the accused persons vide

FIR No.27 of 2009 on 3

rd

August, 2009, i.e., after the expiry

of about 20 years from the commission of the alleged

offence by them.    Both the accused are in their public

life because respondent No.1 is the Chi ef Minister of the

State,  whereas  his  wife  accused – respondent  No.2  is  a

former  Member  of Parliament.    In  the  nature  of  the

evidence  available  on  record,  discussed  supra,  they

have  rightly  been  acquitted  from  the  charges.

Therefore,  on  this score and  on merits  also, no  case  is

found to be made out against the m.

Crux of the above discussion and conclusion drawn:

130 .  In view of what has been said hereinabove,

the petitioner has no locus -standi to file the appeal as he

i s not a victim within the meaning of Section 2(wa) of the

Code, hence not competent to file the appeal against

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– 130 –

the  judgment  of  acquittal  dated 24

th

December,  2012

passed by learned Special Judge (Forests), Shimla.

131 .  Admittedly,  the  petitioner  has  been

convicted  in  few  of  the  cases  which  were  registered

against  him  during  the  period  when  accused-respondent No.1 previously was  also the Chief Minister of

Himachal  Pradesh.  Of  course,  appeals  against  his

conviction  he  preferred  are  pending  disposal  in  the

Supreme  Court.  Admittedly,  the  petitioner  has  also

instituted  civil  and  criminal  cases  against  accused -respondent  No.1,  out  of  which  few  stands  disposed  of

whereas  few  are  still  pending  disposal.  The  facts,

therefore,  remain  that  the  petitioner  is  inimical  to

accused- respondent No.1.

132 .  The petition even does not disclose sufficient

cause as required for condonation of 96 days’ delay, as

occurred in filing the appeal. The expiry of the limitation

prescribed for filing the appeal has resulted in a valuable

right in favour of the accused -respondents and the same

cannot be taken away on such grounds,  which are not

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– 131 –

only  vague,  absurd,  but  false  also.  On  merits  also,  no

case  is  found  to  be  made  out  against  the  accused-respondents. Therefore, there is no merit in this petition

and  the  same  is  accordingly  dismissed.  Consequently,

the petition for seeking leave to appeal and the appeal

itself  shall  also stand dismissed.  Pending application(s), if

any, shall also stand disposed of.

 

May  20, 2015                   (Dharam Chand Chaudhary),

(rc/ps)              J udge.